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Introduction
Consciously or unconsciously, land reform l he.s come to
be regarded as

8

nowertul force,2 and indeed often as a con-

dition, tor bringing about socio-economic tmd nol1t1cel
chenge in the countr1es now d1nlomat1cally referred to ee
less developed.

Thus, 1n eupnort of this clAim, no lees An

lmuortant international forum then the U.N. has lent its sunnort to the nrominence land reform deserves a8 e strategy for
development. 3

Indeed, given a nro~er concention, there is

hardly any resson to believe otherwise.

However, there

to be little consensus on the content, extent, end

a~~ears

modus onerendi of land reform amongst both the nolltical
leedereh1n of the lese develoned countries end the expert
advisors

th~+'

influence oninions and decisions of home and

foreign governments.

Thus, tor

exam~le,

exce~t

for nlati-

tudes ceIling for a -bssic restructuring" of eoc10-economic
and nolit1cal institutions, the methods of acquis1tion of
"priv8te "1~~nd8 for redistribution, the lends to be effected
by

A

land reform

~rogram,

comneneation should be

methode of oomnensetlon, whether

m8~e,

th~

resultant tenure structure,

etc. are all subjects of controversy.

More imnortantly,

there i8 e nernlclouB absence of ettention given to the
over-ell cond1 t10ns which must "Orecede and 8.ccomT}sny lend.
reform

~rogr8m8.

Coneequently, for some land reform 1s

2

merely the redistribution ot -property or rights in lend tor

the benefit ot ema11 farmers and agricultural workere.,4 For
others, land retor. 18 -any 1mprovement in the 1nst1tutions
ot land tenure or agrioultural orgAnl~atlon.-S

For at1ll

others - and these are the ones that have been 8uccesaru1 land retorm has been v1ewed and 1mplemented 1n a much more
comprehensive way than in Juat the mere redistribution ot

land or the improve.ent ot agrar1an inst1tut1ons.

In this

latter conception, land retorm 18 one - no doubt a major -

weapon that 18 used 1n c10ae conJunotion with others suoh
industrial1zation and planning to revamp exist1n
economio and political institut1ons.

In th1

88

oc10-

sense, land

reform 1. 1ndeed more a strategy in social revc1utlon than

one ot patchy reform.
In Eth1onia, land reform in the aen8e ot any ot the

8.bove 'Y·ariants has

to come.

-Who shall own the 1andt

Surely, the questions:

Who shall own the countrY81det· 6

are too rund••ental tor long to remain in the background.
These are the central quest10ns 10 the wave of revolution.
1n Atrioa, Aaia and Latin America.?

And, aa Wililam H1nton

aays,
IThat revolution, tar tram 47ing away, 18 1ntensiSooner or later, all those countries where
agriou1tural pro~uotion 1a a aa1n souroe ot wealth
- and the relation between owners and producers a
major .ouree ot oontliot - wl11 undergo great
transformations. IS

tying.

In theae c1rcu.atances, .oae .&7, the test ot 'good government l i8 it. abi11ty to provide .olutions to theae burning

questlons betore they attaln 'crisls prooortlona l9 rather
than to merely hope that they would not ariee or that they
would be answered by 80me halt-hearted and shoddy reform.
Yet, that such is the extent of reforms or the attitude of
power holders 1n feudal or sem1-feudal societ1es ls perfectly
congruous with the incorrig1b1e but normal habit of rullng
cla8sea who not only rely on the etflcacy of thelr mea.ns
intension management (alded and abetted by their a111es),
but a180 cannot seriously be expected to s1gn their own death
certiticate by passing lava that are serioualy detrlmental or
wholly deatructlve ot their cla8s

except to make a

lnter~sta

modlcum of conceasions.
MAklng neceeeary changes ln agrarian 1nstitutlons ls
made particularly vexing tor the
cauae,

~re.ently

Et~iopian

ruling class be-

aa in historlcal times, state and economlc

power are almost excluslvely a function ot the control and
mani~ulation

ot land or its

~roduce.

The land ln Ethlon1a haa

been and remalns today the buls ot the organlzation ot state
power and, theretore, the ln8trmaentot rule.
ca~1tal1at

Exce'Dt in the

order ot economy which creates the 'sophistic

11lu8ion that it has no regulation ot labour, that labour ia
the reault ot tree and autonomous w111",10 property relationship. in Ethiop1a as elaewhere where land 18 the major basis

ot the organization ot 80ciety, are designed to regulate the
d1stribut1on ot power among 1nstitutions and individuals and
lAbour amongst those who hAve to pertorm it.

Accordingly,

4

the Actus.l tiller of the land in Ethiopia is end has been the
fundaments1 basis upon whlch, to use Philip A. Raunls exoression, an "lnverted pyramid ot clalmants to his out'Out. Ifll
rests end has rested in historical times.

Hence, the neces-

sity to view real land reform as deenly affecting not only
economic but Also 80ciel and nolitical reletlonehlns going
down to the very foundations of the Ethioni8n SOCiety and '001Ity.
88

Hence too, the necessity to view pronerty re1atlonshlns

exnl81nlng the tenaclty with which nower holders cllng to

existing

err8n~ements

And the re1uctence with which they

ftn'Oro8ch, it and when they do, requests for eocia1 change.
Since the egrerlan situation holds,

88

we sh81l show

later, grave imo11catlons for deve1o"Oment and, 1n general,
for the future course of events in Ethlonia, the questlon. of
change in 8.gr8rla.n institutions cannot be nut off indefinitely, even 1n sp1te of the reluctance of those who stand to gsln
by the pernetuation of such institutions.

Actually, even

though the broad goals ot soclo-economic and nolltlcAl modernIzAtion may not, 8S we shall show later, be 8cconrollshed
by the exnedlent of tenancy reform snd even lend redistributlon, land reform once a -forbIdden and subverslve N tonIc has
now attained at leAst t)aper nrominence ln the develonment
nrograms or the country.
An an'D8.rent recogn1tlon or the need for land reform as
8

strAtegy, and indeed 1n the words of the Second FIve Year

Plan

8.S

8. s1ne

qUA

non, for develonment

"nne8r~d

tlme 1n November of 1961, when the Em'Oeror 1n

8

for the fl,rst
rather lofty

s
speech declared that:
"The fundamental obstacle to the reallzation ot Ethiopla'. agrlcultural potential has been, simply stated,
the lack ot secur1ty in the land. The produce ot the
land must be enjoyed by h1m whose toll baa produced
the crop. "12
The thlnking expressed in

~hia

quotation represents a drama-

tic polnt of departure trom the sllence ot the centuries, and
even trom the posit1on taken 1n the reg1me ot law

ado~ted

by

the clvil code, promulgated only a year earller.
Why a Budden sh1ft ot attitude toward land retorm?

In

December ot 1960, a group ot off1cers and civi11ans (one ot
whom was an 1ntellectual) attempted and tailed to oust the
Monarchy.

During the very short period that the coup lasted,

its leaders aeriously charged the Government with tailure to
bring about "econoaic development, educat1on, and (better)
l1v1ng standards,"l) deapite 1ts 'mountain ot promises.'
Admittedly, the

~ol1tical

statements ot the leaders ot the

coup on land retorm were not particularly prominent, except
tor ocoaaional references to the fact that "most ot the land
i8 owned by a tev people ll4 and despite the long-standing
interest ot one ot thea in land retorm, which interest, inCidentally, he attended to very well by distr1buting land to
the landless in a certain district ot whlch he had been appOinted Governor pr10r to the coup.lS
It i8 futile to argue whether the new leadershlp would
have carried out land reto1'll 1 teelt, and ot what kind.
point here i8 that the

COUl)

The

vaa instrumental in providing the

impetua for the idea ot land reform in Ethiopia for the t1rst

6

time.

This is evident trom the hurry with whioh

Is~eciall

commlttees were appo1nted to lexplore ways and means ot
apeedlng the development ot our nat10n in various flelds,116
one ot which was the Land Reform Committee.
More recently, 1and retorm has oecome llvened ty the
desire to imoress international oplnlon, to appease progresslve elements in the bureaucracy and outside of it, and the
necessity to obtain foreign aid.

The latter pressure 18

part1cularly powertul in providing grlst for the leglslat1ve
mill.

Currently, Sweden, the United States, and the World

Bank have all embarked on agrlcultural development in the expectatlon that aome k1nd of land reform legislat10n w1ll soon
become a reality.
~iven

the intens1ty and magn1tude ot the problem,

ho~

ever, foreign ald or no ald, land reform must become a reality.
By ita very nature, lend retorm 1nvolves to a greater or
lesser degree,

de~ending

on one's view ot 1t,

8

re-orderlng

ot -prO'J)erty torma and the norms that detine them.

Th1s 18

true whether such forms take pre-feudal and feudal characterlstics. or are

co~letely li~erated

trom such characterist1cs.

Although it has been seen ln many cases merely as a nolit1cal
gimmick. the process at land reform has also been regarded as
1ntimately related to the goal ot hastening the
80cia1 and eoono.10 deve1opaent.

~roce8s

ot

As such, the re-ord.ered

property forms must be JU8tified by the degree to wh1ch they
~romote

being.

the process ot econom1c development and social well-

7
The purpose ot this pAper is two-told:

on the one

hand, 1t attempts to exam1ne the nature ot property relationships in land extant in Ethiop1a tOday w1th

A

v1ew to out-

l1ning their 1mplications tor development And, on the other,
ofters a perspect1ve by which ex1st1ng relationships may be
cr1ticized and attempts at rearranging such relat10nsh1na
may be evaluated.

8
CHAPTDl J

A Stat •• ent ot the Problem
A.

The Setting
Ethiop1a 18 predom1nantly an agr1cultura1 country with

AS

much a8 ninety percent ot its labour toroe engaged in

agr1culture. 17

About two-thirds ot the gross domestic pro-

duct or1g1nates trom th18 sector. l8
These tacta are not only enough to prove the importanoe

ot agriculture in the Eth10pian economy, but also 1ndicate
1ts low-level produot1v1ty.

Indeed, tor most Eth1op1an peas-

ants, agriculture i8 not merely a way ot lite
bru1ted

8S

it 1s otten

about, but more bleakly a means of 8urv1va1.

Since

agricultural product1vity 1s 80 very lOW, and the nature or
property re1at10ns 80 1nequ1table, the 1iv1ng standards ot the
ma.8es ot rural people 18 one ot the lowest 1n Atrica.

Conse-

quently, poverty and 8uttering are Widespread; and only tive
percent ot the popu1at10n is literate. l9

Med1cal servlces,

concentrated 1n a tew b1g c1ties, and even then avallable as
they are moatly to the landlords and ladles, and government
employees, do not reach the broad masses of the

neo~le.

Only

one percent ot the rural people can expect to be attended by
a medical doctor dur1ng the1r l1te time. 20
Perhaps, one ot the most discern1b1e ettects ot low
agricultural produotion has been the cODstant necessity to 1m~ort

toodstufts to provide raw mater1als tor ama11 leale 1n-

dustries, and to counteract acute grain shortages that have
been occurring 1n the countr7 particularly in recent yeara. 21
Reportedly, one ot these shortages vaa respons1ble tor

9
claimlng the lives

01'

a8 many as 1.5 mlllion people. 22

S1gn1tlcantly too, Ethlop1a has increasingly become a reOipient

01'

"tood tor relief" and 'char1ty" trom the Unlted

States. 2 3
Paradoxloa1ly, th1s state

01'

a1'ta1rs happens 1n a coun-

try whose natural advantages ln the excellence ot her cllmate
and the tertility ot her 8011, experts have
now contirmed.

or

fo';~· 8.

long tlme

a total 01' potent1ally cultivable area of

about 79 ml1lion hectares, only about seventeen percent 1s
presently under cultlvatlon. 24
No one c1alms that the task of transformlng traditlonal
agrlculture trom its mould is a tacile bus.lness.

Yet, that

1s where the "battle tor long-term econom1c development wl11
be won or lost." 2S To wln the battle, the tramework wlthln
whlch agriculture operates has to be la1d down.

B.

The Problem rurther Derined
The basic problem 1. the low level 01' agricultural nrc-

duotlon.

Thls same problem . .y be seen in lts many-sided

sapecta:-

1)

Methods

01'

Cult1vatlon

and methode of

cult1vatl~n

In general, tarming lmplements
recall and are more appropriate

tor b1blical times than tor the twentieth century.

Tyolcally,

'Equipment 1n general use 18 very pr1mltlve. The
plow i8 the pr1nc1~.l tarm lmole.ent in the nlateau;
the hoe 18 more common in the South.
The typical
nlow only turns the top 8011 And operatlon must be
repeated .everal t1aes to prepare the ground tor
planting. Snades and hoe. ot nUllerOU8 ehapea and
aizes are (al80) uaed tor a variety ot chorea." 26

10
Commercial tertilizers, new and better 8eed8, pest1cides,
etc. are used on a tew co.mercial tarms but are virtually
absent on the t1Pic61 peasant tarms. 27
Many would frown upon the level at technology and the
general practioe ot taraing but would find the explanation
tor the.e in the illiteracy ot the peasants.

Some, on the

other hand, are impressed by the quality of Ethiopian
ants.

~eaB

Thus, Doreen Warriner saya that:
lIn spite at constraints, the peasant bas developed
var, sbrewd technique8 ot land and livestock management, and th1. native knowled2e torma a very promi8ing baaia tor development: V2 8

In tact, in terma ot tarming knowledge, the
most literate in
2)

Zth10~lan

Parm Size Structure

~ea8ant

18 the

soc1ety.

Broadly speaklog, the trad1tional

agricultural structure 18 unaultable tor and inhibitive ot a
viable agrioulture.

In general, agriculture i8 organized 1n

two land tenure 818t... - the 80-0alled cOllllunal ownership ot
the Northern halt ot the country, and the large individual
ownership ot the South.
No atudy haa yet been undertaken by the GoV'dlJrnment to
determine the degree ot concentration at

ovner8bi~

ot land.

Ho••ver, information complled trom land tex registers confirms
the cODllDon knowledge 10 Ethiopia that large chunks of idle 8l1d
cultivated land belong to a rew individuals, the Crown, the
Ohurch, and eyen the GoTernaent.

According to the most recent

report, the largeat holdings reoorded tor Rlate-Gul t*, Gebbar,·
and Semon* are IS3S, 405, and 16) gaaba.. respeotivel1. 29

11

Even aore reveallng 18 a atudy made ot Hararghe Province whloh ahova that

.event7-~lve

peroent

o~

the aeasured

land area in the whole province belongs to 0.2$ ot the total
number ot landowner. 1n the Provlnce. 30
rrom thl.

~act o~

conoentratlon ot ownershlp, aome have

argued that the

~roble.

ot underutl1izatlon ot re.ources

ari8ing troa the luneoono.lo· slze of holdings 1s lout ot the
quest1on.,'l

The point thl~ arguaent oontuae., however, 1.

the practical dlfterence between the ooncentratlon ot ownershlp and 1t. operatlonal 8ignlfioanoe.

In other WOrd8,

whether ln the North Where 'comaunal ownershlp' 18 sald to prevail or 1n the South where extensive private ownershlp predominatea, owner8h1p has no signlfloance to the slze ot agriConsequent17, .1n both parte ot the

cultural operations.

countr.7, 81xt7-tive peroent of the pea.ant tarms are less than
a heotare. 32

'rhus, tor 1n.tanee, both tigre which ia a

I'or purpo.es ot tasat10D theae teras are detlned. as:
• Riate-'Jult: heritable tenure under which the peraon enJoying suoh right ie entitled Ito oollect land tax pre.cribed
bJ la.1 tro. persons holding lan41n the area to which his
right extended. Out ot the . .ount so oollected, he was
obliged to 1»87 • port10n ot 1t to the Goverruaent.
• Gebber: individual ownerah1p under wh1ch • pereon holding
.......oh right ])a78 land and other taxe. to the Gov8rmaent.
• Sellon: lLand o.er which the Govern.ent baa ceded its
rights ot taxation to the Church.• Gasha:

40 hectares.

Por an understanding
Ill.

o~

theee propert7 relatione, ee. Chapter

12

Northern nrovince and
thAt 45% and 41%

~etra

which i8 a Southern one report

re8~ectively

or their holdIngs ra1l under

the size-group of half a hectare. 33

Therefore, the s1ze ot

farm structure 18 a very relevant 1ssue to the questIon of
agriculturel

~roductlon.

Further, the

~roblem

ot low agrIcultural nroduct1on 1s

compounded by the existence of large ldle lands 1n the nstr1mony or a rew individuAls while the small farmers nartlcu1ar1y 1n the North rret 1t out under the double nreS8ure of
rieing

3)

~ODulatipn

8

and dw1ndling fert1lity of the soll.

Agricultural Surolus and Ca'01tal Accumulat10n

It 1s

obv10us that the low level ot techn1que extant in the subs1stence sector, the unecono.lc

8I~e

ot farm structure, and the

existenoe of large idle lands are all not only irrational but
a180 1nh1bitive ot raD1d c8nltal accumulation.
Moreover, rente, tIthe

(a8ra~),

tees, etc.

~81d

to the

cla88 ot landowners, and var10us torms ot taxe@ na1d to the
Church and other r1ght holders ot a sImilar tyne are all
sources ot Dotent1sl lurolus capable ot be1ng ted back Into
agr1culture and invested in more l)roduct1ve economIc actIv'.tIel 1n other sectors ot the economy.
Why

the landlords, the Churoh, and other

rI~ht-holdere

do not undertake nroduct1ve act1v1ties either In agriculture
or in other seotors ot the economy, we shall attemnt to
exnlain later.

13
Obviou8l~,

thi8 brief outline cannot pretend to ex-

hauat the problema ot Ethiopia's agricultural development or
the miserable standard of 11ving of ita people.

It i8 merely

an attempt bl • non-economist to concentrate on 80me aspecta
or the J)roble.. 111 an effort to relate them tentatively to
their lnstitutional setting.
Manl authors have, by the use of What!. Szentes haa
called the 'subtraction

a~roach,'

tound the explanation tor

the phenOilenon of un4erdevelopaent in the shortage ot oapi tal,

the 1aok ot natural resource., etc., and in the absence ot a
'long llst of quallties, propenaltles, motivatlon., and incen-

tives that, 1n contrast to tbe advanoed countries, are mJIBing
in the underdev.loJ)ed ••• -34 (z.t,ha81s in the original).

SOIDe

11ke MoClelland have gone ad ab.urdua and tound the explanation 1n the absence of what the latter c8118 In-Aehievement. 1 3S
However, tbe 'loglc' ot theae explanations 8a 8zent.8 'POinte
out 1s ••re17 to
b.cau~e

8., that

the advanoed countries are advanced

their nationals po..... economica1ll

8001a1 and pS1chological behartors.
hope1 •••ly tautological and

e~n

Qui te

ap~ropriAte

a-part trom being

raclal, such explanatIons are

incapable ot anewering, ln the one c.se, the question ot how
8uch attitude.

0...

to be pos •••• ed b1 the advanced countries

in the tir.t ~lace,)6 and 1n the other, ot how suro1u. 18 ~ro
duoed, who approprlate. lt, and how .uoh surplus 1. used. 3?

In An7 di.cus.lon of the deve1o-pment process, the social
relatione of -production, ot Which propertf relationship. Are

e major

a.~ect,

tigure .. one ot the moet important and crucial

14
determinants

or

the tavourabll1ty or unravourabl11ty ot the

mode ot production within wh1ch productIon and soc1a1 ex1stence take place.

And to the extent that land reform, in-

volvIng as it doe8 a change in property relat1onships,

mar

have a role to play in the development process, the question
ot what propert7 relationships are .ost conducive to develop-

ment becomes unquestionably

I~rtant.

By property re1at1on-

ships we under.tand more thaft the nuaerua clausus ot real
rlghts; we include 1n It 80clal stratltication, the distrIbutlon ot

~oyert

and tbe •• terlal and oultural conditlons ot

the tolllng pea.ant .......

,

15

~e

A.

Nature ot Property Relatlon8hlp.

Introductory:
It cannot but be adIlltted that the torlla and the nature

ot property relationships in Boclety are generally histori-

ca111

s~ecitic

to the

~rev.iling

mode ot

As

~roductlon.

Marx's tamous atate.ent ba8 it,

lIn the soc181 production ot their eXistenoe, men
inevitably enter into det1nlte relations, whloh
are independent ot their wll1, n...l, relatione
ot production appropriate to • given .tage ot
deyelopaent ot their ••terial torces ot ~roduc
tlon. l ,a
On this Tie., property relationship. are the legal (or

a.ry,

a8

cU8tom~

the ca.e JDa7 be) expressions ot the relations ot llro-

duction.

Thus, JUBt as it 18 unlikely to tind private

~ro

perty in land, tor example, ln pre-historic times, so one does
not tind

pr~erty

burdened with teudal obllgations in can1tal-

ist or soc1alist society.
While this much .87 be a4altted, the general stage ot
development, and therefore the general mode ot vroduction a
society baa attained, partloularly whether a society 1. teuda1
in the Western senae 1s otten the subJeot ot debate.

!hoBe

who ••• teudalls. on17 .. a Western torm ot aoclal, economic
and

~olitical

e18ewhere.

organization are reluctant to tind such a aYBtem

Otten this 18 done by iaolatlng certain unique

Weatern European teature. merel7 to contirm
other locleties.

th~ir

absence in

Accord1ngly, the .oat important teature 1n

'Western teuda11.a" i . aeen in the tact that teudal inat1tu-

tiona aroae out at

8

need tor protection, which in turn gave

16
rise to the -protective relatlon8hip set up by one tree man
over another' called co. .endatlon.J9
80 tor eX88ple, dlacu8stng the property inatitutions or

Perala, Laabton talls to tind teudaiis. here precisely because
-Whereas a contractual relatlonship vaa an e8aentla1 characteristic ot (W.stern Peuda11•• ), the element or contract never
bec . .e a reature ot the Igt.,~ an institution str1kingly
similar, it not iaentlcal, to Ethiopla-.

~,

.e ve shall aee

subsequently.
Obviously, auch a aetinitlon y1elds merely a Juridlcal
relation between a

y . . .a1

and • prlnee and, lndeed, may be no

more than ot ornaaental value to the teudal alatem as a mode

ot production ainee It vas not the idea ot contractual relationshlp that vaa the motive torce 10 changing teudal Europe.
Maurlce Dobb, on the other hand, baa convincingly lald the emphasl. on -the relation between the direot producer ••• and hi.
lmmed1ate superlor or overlOrd and (on) the aocial-economic
content ot the obllgatlon which oonnecta them. 141 The great
merit ot .uch a detinition 11e8 in ita lsolation ot the dominant relation ot production which nourishes ln ltselt the
ele.ents ot change in the systea.

Furthermore, thla detini-

tlon, unlike those which ylev European teuda118m
"dlst1nct1ve genu.' by

eap~lz1ng

8S 8

'Juridlcal character1stics

and dlrterentla,' admits ot variations in the way 1n which
surplua product i. a~roprl.ted trom the dlrect nroducers. 42
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B.

Pro2erty Relations at the Peaaant
In the North:

The tundamentAl

here is expressed by the term
(In Tlgrlgna).

~

~evel
nro~erty

institution

(in AlLluirlc) and Rlat!

frequently, although ai.tatenly, the aystem

in which this torm ot property oooura haa been called comUnder thl& sy&tem ot rlghts, any landholdlng 1.

munal.

theoretlcally traced back to • Ifirst settler l or -foundlng
tather-.

Any aeaber ot a taal1y that oan trace back his

lineage to such a progenltor 1s thus entitled to the perpetual
uae and enJoyaent ot the land.
l~.o

!hus, every rist right 1s

facto held by hereditary right.

Otten, 8inee land can

be lnherlted cognatlca11y, a peraon 8ay hold plota ot land in
d1tterent parlahea.

Indeed, he . .y even step lnto h1s wlte l s

rlghta to ausaent the a1Ee and Dumber ot his hold1ng8.
elsewhere ln Atrica, no 'cbiets- are

re8~on81b1e

Unlike

tor the al-

location ot righta in land.

Noy, the co_on view ldeallEed especlally by anthropo10glat8, and those who fashion the1r opin1ons atter them 18
that land rlghts under suoh a system belong to "the living,
the dead, and the unborn'.
18 .a impossible a

Ascr1bing land right8 to the dead

Dr~o81t1on

a. it i. absurd.

The nurno8e

ot the ideology, undoubtedl7 toraed At a time when land was
bount1ful in relation tQ populatlon, la aerely to convey the
idea that land oannot be 801d,

a8

indeed it 18 rarely 80ld.

As a result, 80ae have been led to believe that "ownershlp
here 18 8ui generls·. 4 ) Even the briefest encounter wlth
Engel l

•

"!he origin ot the

~ami17,

pr1vate property and the

18
State' ls enough to dispel the notlon that ownershlp i8 sui
ganeri8 here.

But let us exaa1ne the clata a little more

c108ely 8ince tro. a misunderstanding

o~

the working rule. ot

tradit10nal property relationa (or bJ deliberate caloulations)
have flowed inappropriate policy prescr1ptions.

One auch

polioy presoription in Ethiopia haa been (although not yet 1mp1emented) a pro~ ot indlvldua1ization44 of pro~erty in
land in the Western t.-hion, aa it mere lndividualization
would by itlelt 40 the triok of increased agrioultural

~ro

duotion.
!he oonoept ot

owner8h1~

i8 detined 1n moat civil law

jurisdiotione as Ithe right ot enjoJing and disposing ot things
1n the moat absolute aanner l .abject to restrictions impo8ed
by 18•• 45

As suoh, the right ot ovnersh1~ is otten rendered

ln teras of it. three abeolute oharacteristic.: absoluteness,
exclusivene.a, and

~rp.tulty.

EYen though the abaolutene8S

ot the right ot owner.hip i. frequently qua1if1ed by the tinal
phraae Wh10h admits or re.triotions 1aposed by 18.,46 the real
glet, in praotice, ot the abaolutene8. of the right relAtes to
its three attributes:

the I r 1ght l • ot use and enjoyment, the

Ir1ght· at abandonment, and the Iright l ot alienation intervivos or mortis causa.

•

As Earl Renner ha. ~ointed out, 1t 18 incorrect to "dissect
ownership into 1nd1Yidualize4 ~wers" Just .. it would be to
Idie.olve the right ot peraonal liberty into the freedom to
sleep, to tat. 8. walt, to .ate a .~ or the oroas l , etc.
Thue the right ot owner.h1p 18 one r1ght - not a bundle ot
r1ghts.
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The exclusive quality ot the right ot ownership as.urea
the owner

IS

privative interest in the property which does not

permit ot equal simultaneous ownership by more than one
8onl.47

pe~

Obvioua1y, this 1. not to say that two or more persons

oannot own a th1ng Jointly_

But it i8 to say that in no case

can each at them be the tull owner ot the thlng at the same
ti •••
"inaIly, the perpetual character ot the right at owner-ship relates to the aba.noe ot any limit in time on its exercis., 1.e. there is no such thing aa Itemporary ownerahip.148
How, in the Ethiopian case where the eo-called communal
tenure preval1s, no aeriOU8 ob.erver can deny the customary
principle encountered and expressed in these areas in the formula: lBeahih Ametu Le_ale Ristu l •• aning that leven atter
the lapse ot a thousand l'eara, the land belongs to him who is
entitled to itl.
ot

ownerahl~

On

the standard characteristic at the right

being perpetual, i.e. unlimited in tlme, this

prinoiple expreases perpetuity even more tellingly and suooinctly than the very clvil law notion ot ownership whloh has
tatherea Arts.1204tt ot our oivil code.

In practice, it 18

tru., the appllcation of thls principle 1s sO complex, arising
malnly froa the praotioe whereby persons - and they are

80

many - ola1. rights on both a14e8 ot their ancestors, that
the d1.tlnotion Hoben baa drawn 1s valid:

20

lIn lta most general sense, riat rlght refers to
the r1ght a person has to a share of the land
f1rst held by any ot his or her ancestors 1n any
line ot descent. In 1ts most restrlcted aen8e,
by contrast lt reters to a spec1t1c t1eld held
by virtue ot 8Uch a recognlzed right i .49
Legally, however, whether a person can successtully convert
his cla1m ot 'rist rlght l into a tangible -specitic tleld' is
a question ot proot, i.e. hls ablilty to valldate hle cla1m

to tltle, and not a consideration capable ot exclud1ng one

or

the oharacterist1cs ot ownershlp, albe1 t !bel'"D't in torm and
strength at the aoment.
Purthermore, rist rights are not collectively exerclsed.
They are neither co11ect1'9'e17 owned nor collectively worked.
The tenancity with which r1st rights are detended and the exclusiveness "hereby each rist land forma "an independent
centre ot production' i.e. the rlat owner tarms hie lend or
leavee it idle, makes his

01111

investment decls10n8, etc.,

"hich operations constitute, in part, the exclusive and absolute qualities ot ownership, hardly lends credence to the
notion ot communa11ty, particularly since r1at rlghts rarely
revert even to the neareat ot kin let alone to a notional
C olUllUlli ty •

Nevertheless, we are tar trom asserting that this system
aoknowledges as yet indiv1dual ownership ln the sense detined
above.

Clearly, the abeence (or relatlve rarity) ot sales in

land - a 81gnlf1cant characteristlc of the absolute quality of
ownershlp - createe the obvious alasing link to a mature right

ot ownershlp.

However, we are arguing that the absence or
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thi8 element i8 far from enough to warrant the notion that
'ownership i8 sui generi8' or 40es not exlst.

For the oonoept

ot ownershlp, whioh evolved into a mature torm - the legal
form in which it i8 found now, even though event8 have again
oVertaken the functlonal norms defining itSO

-

generally only

atter the breakdown of teudal soolety and its replacement by
that ot the market, i8 historically specltic to the economic
and soclal condltions in which it c.ame to be recogn1zed as such.
The signiticance ot the right ot ownershlp must not be understood by whether the bill of norms by whlch lt is detined i8 in
practice sat18fled or not.

Rather, lts slgnlflcance lie8 in

the 'unlimited P0881billtles" ot use and disposal, whatever
the manner, it otters the indlv1dual.

And the extent to which

the rlght ot ownershlp may be u8ed and d18posed 18

ot the level ot maturlty ot the economy.

8

funct10n

In subs1stence eco-

nomles 8uch as 1n Eth1opia, as 18 well known, production 1s
largely tor U8e - not the market - both by the direct producers
and, in the Ethlopian caae, by a teudal 01a88.

Hence, one ot

the pos8ibi11ties tor disposal i.e. alienation inter-v1vos or
morti8 causa i8 largely absent in the Rist system because ot
the nature ot the economy which does not aftord a ready mar-ket
not only for the land but even tor the produce thereot, and
because ot the 80c1al need tor the continuity ot the family
organized around and predicated upon land and land rights.
Henoe too the f1erce opposit1on by ri8t ownera to anything
that amacke

o~

eyentuation 10 land sales.

hension that the

anthro~olig1Bt

It 1B this misappre-

betrays when he den1es the

22

exlstence ot owner8hlp in Northern Ethiopia or where he
regArds lt 88 "au1 generl. 1 on the basis ot an unhiatorloal
method of analyais.
Vlewed historlcally, however, there ia ot course ownerIhip although 1imita are put on 1ta exercise by the underdeveloped nature ot the economy and the t8.a1ta ot aocial and
famillal organizatlon lt 18 called upon to serve.

As such,

Rlat 18 the medium by whlch aocl&1 and economic relationships
are express.d, on a horlzontal plane between one peasant and
another.

Aa a legal instltution, too, lt 8erves the function

of etfectlng the allocatlon and the aoolal regulat10n ot the
major 80uroe ot wealth - land.

It is thus the tundamental

baal. upon which the peasant undertakes product1ve work And
via which he particlpates in the national economy.
Thus, we have at the root ot the socio-economic system
a common human denominator - the small peasant

~

tarming h1e

own plece ot land, tormlng al it doe8 an "independent centre

ot product1on" , w1th very 11ttle specia11zation and exchange.
In the South:
1s the

.hare-cro~er

The analogue ot the peasant in the North
In the South.

Share-cropping tenancy is

'Predomlnantly an agrarian teature ot the 8edentary population
ot the elght (out ot 14) nrov1nces ot Southern Eth1op1a.

Whereas the peasant in the North may have the

~sycholog1cAl

aatiltaetlon ot contidently asserting that Ito be landless ls
to be aubhuman ' ,5 l hi. counterpart in the South has to toll on
a plece of land that he used to own but no longer does. In the
a
North, as we aaw above, r1st 18 Boclo-econom1c and legal

2)

1nat1tution unlt1ng the peasants, ln the South it unltes not
the tillers ot the land but ita owners.

Here, the tillers

are united by the instltut10n ot tenancy, and aa in the North
each wlth hia own aaa11 piece ot land with very little market
relatlona.
The incidence ot tenanoy 1s high and otten takes a
character lnconsistent with human dignlty.
s

That thia i8 80 ls

functlon ot the hiatory ot thia part ot the country 1n the

late nineteenth century.

In the wake ot Emperor Mene11k II's

conquest ot the Southern provincea, ocourred a wave
tull Beale appropriation ot land.

or

near-

In the course of this con-

quest Men.11k wrote extensively upon the South, almo8t as it
on a olean slate, the teudal property relat10nships of the
North and Bome novel variants.

As

8.

pre11ll1nary measure, up-

warda ot two-thirds ot the land waa cont1scated and the righttul owners reduced, at one stroke, to the atatus ot aerta. 52

The conditions ot sertdom were
8.US,

80

brutal that Atework Gebrey-

a chronicler at the time, wrote:

'When Christiana are thua terr1bly oppressed by
their brother Christiana ,one can lIIag1ne the
condition ot the poor pagans who are treated
11ke doga.'S3
.
Under such a atatue, the peasant was required to pertorm innumerable obligation. tor the overlords, including the payment
of "rent', cultivating their lands, carrying wood and w8ter
tor them, and in general pertor3ing any other kinds of labour

eerv1aee.
Northern

Indeed th1s practice Y8S nothing unfami11ar to the
~eaaant

too.

Of the latter, it has been sald:
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• ••• the •• Telleina are l1ke oame18, they alway.
cry, "eep and groan when they are loaded, but ln
the end they rlae w1th the burden that 1. put on
thell and car17 1 t , • S4
not mindful that
• ••• It la also true that they rail wlth their

burden and then the owner 108e8 both the camel
and the load, ·SS

not to .entlon that, when they choose J they __y also throw

otr the burden altogether.
80m8 ot the worst teature. ot thi. s1 tuat10n have been
gradual17 re.oved 1n the laat thirty to torty years.

Yet,

auoh remalns ot the preYlou. soclal and econoa10 condit10ns ot
the landles. pe..antry that even today, the rendering ot per.onal serylce. 'tor no r_uneratlon continue. unabated. 56

Not

on17 do tenant. haYe to entertain thelr abeentee landlords
with viotual. when the latter tancy to Tialt their taraa, but

a180 bear the obllgation to transport the landlords' ahare ot
the orop to • de.tlnatlon t.po.ed by the latter. S1

No wonder

then that a group o't tenants liv1ng onl1 45 kilometre. troll
the natlon'. capl tal, where one would expect the inrluence.

ot aodemizatioD to have taken root, could with b1tterne ••
aummarlze thelr sltuatlon and that or other. by the .tatement:
'Ch1a!8l1a Malet Aaker na.·S 8 .. tenancy aeana servitude.
Apart 'troa the reaaon. expre8.e4 above, the rollowing
bear out the stateaent.
Plrat17, the paJaent o't 'rent' calculated a. a tixed
share ot the produce ot the land, whlch varle. between onethird and one-hal't ot the crop beara very little or no relation
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either to the productivity of the land, or to the costs incurred by the tenant.

Rent 1& detera1ned by custom - custom

whioh goes back to the time wben the teudal claas imposed all
kinds ot dues. on a subject peasantr7.
payaents do not

r.~ect

In other words, suoh

.uoh leee .mbody leoonom1c rent',

arrived at by the ru1es ot the la. ot supply and demand.

'l'he

civil oode speaks, therefore, ot a legal fiction when it reters
to th1s aa a 'oontract

or

1e88e l • 59

Seoondly, the p.,aent ot tithe commonly known as Aarat
in Ethiopia - a teudal legal institutlon par excellence - 18
Itlll part ot the tenant's obl1gation to the landlord.

~o

be

sure, thls obligatlon ... legal17 supooaed to encumber landownership.

Even the clrtl code had m.de the landlord respon-

slble tor the paJaent ot the 'burden charging the immovable.,60
More reoently, the Agrlcul tural Income Tax Proclaa.tlon ot 1967
had

al80

the ~urpose ot abo1lshing the pr8ctlce~1 In tact,

ho"ever, .11 these haft been nothing lIore tban Iphantom' legislation.

Beoaule ot the ev1dently ...yaetrloal nature ot the

loolo-econo.l0 and political structure pervasive 1n the society, lt haa been historic8ll,. 8. well a. contemporaneously an

e.IY matter tor the landown1ng 0188. to .hitt their obl1gation
to their tenantl, Dot merel,. to ottset 8Uch obllgation but

even to .ate

~rotlt

on 1t:

'Where the .arket value ot the -.. rat' (~a1d in nroduce) ••• exoeed. the tax 1n lieu ot tl the, the landlord Ihltt. to the tenant .ore than the tu. The
1ikel1hood ot th1. i . high; tor the market value ot
a tenth ot the gro •• output on a gaaha (40 hectarea)
ot tertlle land 18 11ke1,. to exoeed the maximum tax
1n lieu ot tithe (l.e. Eth.t3S.00)1.62
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Add to this the tact that ln man1

ca888,

the tenant doe8 have

to pay also tees to obtain or renew tenancy rlghts tram the
In one area, the amount ot suoh pay-

landlord or hl. agent.

ment ranged between Eth•• 20 and t40 per hectare ot land. 6)
'l'h1rdlJ', notwithstanding the tact tbat tenanc1es aay oc-

casionally be ot long duration - indicatlng the unavallability

ot alternative eOODOillc OJ)!,ortunlties - the landlord has the
right conaecrated bJ' cuetoa to evict h1. tenant w1th
and on

an,. pretext

80

auch

80

I

1mpu~1ty

that even a slight misunder-

standing between the two 18 enough reason for forthwith evict lon.

For. penon tor whoa dally bread 18 more lJll)ortant

than expensive litigation in the entangled Judicial system ot
Ethiopia, the ohoice 18 clear - he seeks no reinstatement nor
any compensatlon - even when the clvil code has provided 80me
remedles. 64 But these remedies cannot reaoh the tenant. tor
a Jlore tund8llental reason.

The mistake ot viewing underdevelopment
in the underdeveloped countries

the absence

88

oertain features prevalent

in the advanced one. does not end wlth development economist,

alone.

It i8 a fallacy

o~

their Jurist colleague. too.

civll code ot Ethiop1a is a product ot one such tallacy.

The

Ita

chlef weakness on the .atter ot tenancy relationsblns 18 the
inoorrect aS8umption that such re1stionshlpa are

.u.oe~t1ble

of regulation under a torau1a of 'freedom ot contract-, a
tormula unhletoricallJ engratted

ot productlon.

By

ado~t1ng

such

essentially

A

feudal mode

tormula the code regards

the ''Partle.- to agr1cultural tenancy relationshlps

a8
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FreedOil ot contraot, with

p08sessing equal bargaining power.

its twin-brother ot peraonal liberty - both products ot

nin~

teenth centur7 liberalls. - preswpposes equallty, at least
ideologically.

But Wbere one ot the

eeonomlca11y, and

~litlcally

~arties

i8 1n a 80c1ally,

subservient positlon as the

~ea8-

ant is in Ethiopia - where even under the constitution he ia
a subject rather than a Oitizen - one Bust join a United
Nations StudT's rea1n4er and conclude that • ••• the lde.ot
equality before the law belng consequently much weaker •••
the 11kelihood ot a tenant actively seeklng to achieve rights
the law contera on hl. ia a alight one '6S indeed.

c.

Relatlona

o~

Aunrooriatlon
...

and Authorlty

----.------~

It haa been pointed out that the pr1ury oondition ot
anJ sort ot avoropriatlon of the labour ot others (even when
thi8 18 acco.pll.bed b7 robberJ) 18 the
a~propr1at1on

1.e. the Doa.lbi1ity ot

~aslbll1tl

~roductlon

amount ot 8urolu. labour and aurolu8 product. 66

at auch

ot a certaln
Indeed, w1th-

out the generation by • soelo-economic syetem ot 8urnlus
duct, no civllilatloD, no progress 18 made possible.
the tact that the surplus

vr04uc~

of one

grou~

~ro

Also,

is appropr1ated

by another •• ans that there auat be 80me authorl tl cApable

entorclng and aanction1Dg suoh approprlation.
~riatlon

ls vredlcete4 upon the

~s.e.8ion

Thus,

a~ro

or such authority

and the attainment by soclety ot • certa1n level or
tlvlt1.

ot

~roduc

Wlthout thes., clas. exploltation 18 1~oa81ble.67

From this perspective, it 18 large17 irrelevant to the
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nossess1ng clsss, whether relat10ns

o~

appropriation and

author1ty were maintained upon the neasantry through the
medium

o~

r1st or sh8re-crooping tenancy

80

long a8 the con-

tent and function of appropriation remained the same or substantially the same.

Coneequently, 1n Eth1opia, whether in

the North where rist 'Orevails or in the South where
cronning tenancy and even small

the function of
t1ally

uni~orm

a~ropr1ation

in each

o~

~ea8ant

shar~

nronrietorship exists,

of surolus has been substan-

theae cases.

Perham Observed about three decades

Thus,8S Margery

a~o:

-This meant thst the cultivator must, as the
Ethiopians themselves e~~resa it, 'carry upon
his shoulders' all that very large nronortion
of the pOTlulation which had withdrawn themselves
~rom work on the land •••• The elaborate systems
of lend tenure and of tribute with all their
nrovlncial variatione represent only the different means by which his services and produce were
utilized by the Government and by other classes.-68
Otten many ob8ervers have been betuddleJ by the great dlverslty of tenure forms

80

much so that some have even snoken of

one-hundred one -types of ovnershlp·69 existing only in one
Ares ot the oountry while others have attributed thp ownerehin
of the land in the entire country to the Emneror. 70

Such

stetements lire engendered otten by a tailure to dl!<tlnguish
between the rights ot the auoroor1ator8 and the Boclo-economic obligations imnosed unon the t1llers ot the lend.

When

this is avoided, we tlnd at the fountainhead ot [thlonlen
feudal

~ronerty

relation8hins the nower of the

grant, 8B they did, rights in land such
ownershin burdened with

88

~eud81 obll~etions

Em~erore

Me.derie

I

to

and even

such e8 the duty
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to transport artillery, tents, etc. and r1ghts to surplus

product such aa Semon, Rlate-Gul!, Gul t, and Ferea.egnet.
These terms wl11 beoOJle olear subsequently, the easential
point to aee 18 that although the rights ot the persons or
1natltut1ons ent1tled to aurplus toOk d1fterent appellatlona,

the t1llers ot the land were the ones, in the tinal analY8is,
on whom thea. obligatlons were llRPoaed.
society, the

~ower

to

appro~riate

As

1n every teudal

aurplus trom the t1l1era,

and the author1ty to do.ln,ate them vested in any person or

institutlon had to be Justlfled 1n the tinal analys18 by a
specif1c tora ot servioe to the orown.

ot feudal relationshlp,a,
any exception.

and to

This 1s a cornerstone

lt there ap-peara to be hardly

Prom the atandpoint ot the tillers, however,

the orig1n ot their 80clo-econo.l0 and

~olltloal

8ubJugation

can be noth1ng else but force as wltnesa the military conquest

ot the South by Menel1k's forcea in the nineteenth century.
There have been -.DY granta of right8 in historical
times, but here only the chlef torma that have subs1sted and
oontinue to exist 1n a modern dres8 wll1 be discussed.

-GultBf tar the most
property

~erya.iY.

r.lation.h1~8

was Gult.

and the queen of all feudal
Suoh right vas usually

granted to i.,ortant 'Per.onages in return tor military service,

and to individual churohes for the propitiation ot God.
the right was heritable, it aeeae to have been known
Gult.

The comb1nation

or

the teras -Ri8t l

~lying

88

When
Rlete-

herita-

bility and IGultl (literally meaning lintemosed between two

)0

d1rectly connected thingsl)?1 indicating intermed1acy renders
such interpretation correct.

Th1s difterence may perhaps ex-

pla1n the relative rar1ty ot the tormer and the relative
abundance ot the latter in present-day Ethiopia.

In both

case8, however, the easence of the right consisted in the appropriatIon ot surplus product trom the peasantry but never
any interest over the land itselt.

As

A ~~'UT)

peasante the.selves correct17 pointed out, the

ot Eritrean
could

Em~eror

create Gult right. over any land, but could never intertere
wlth their ri8t rights.72

As such, Gult wes mainly the medium

by which the peasants' eurplus

1fIUI

extracted, and trom the

Emperors' polnt ot vlew, the formula by which the support and
alleglance of the churches and nobles
.alntenance provided.

W88

secured and their

In an economy where the use ot money

was undeveloped, to sal the least, the formula or Gult nrcvlded the .eane by whlch the serTiees ot 8uch

~erson8

and insti-

tutions may be paid.
Such. relation ot
8

relation ot authorlty.

ment ot rule.

Aa

a~rODri.tIon

vent hand in hand with

Ae such, Gult was also an instru-

Hoben has correctly observed,

l(J.ul t rights were thu8 tar aore than Just a tyoe
ot land tenure. They were an integral part or
the Amhara (Ethio~lan) teudal nolity tor they
rep~e.ented the granting away by a regIonal ruler
ot an lmnortant part of hie (the state's) taxational, Jurldical and adm1nistratlve authority".?)

Consequently, not only could the Emperore and regional rulers
(by derived authority) create Gult in any nart ot the country,

but also 1n tact-virtually all arable and 1nhabited land was
held by someone or some institutIon

8S

2Y1!.74

There

WAS

no

)1

land without a aasterl.?S

From such a Jurldical, political,

and adm1ni8tratlve point ot vantage, the Gu1t holder was
actually an autocrat ln h1s own r1ght virtually replicat1ng
at the reglona1 level the absolute pover ot the Emperor at the
top.

Correspondlngly, the peasant.y wae 8ubJect to an intin-

ite number ot due. and obllgatlons (besldea the ba8ic land
tax and tithe) ranging

trOll

labour servlce on Hudad lands

(belonglng to the Emperor, nobles, etc.)76 to the payment ot
due. on the marriage ot their aons .,;od daughters and the commemoration ot a death 1n the taa1ly.??

Slnce the right or

Gult vaa held al..,s at the pleasure ot the grantor,

ment to the

~o.ltlon

an~olnt

ot Gult va. regarded a. a passport to

wealth - an opportWllty to aake ha7 vhile the 8UD ahined ..
~8rticu1ar17

aince the 0u1t holders were not, even in theory,

held to any aervice to the peasantry.

In a 8ystem which ac-

knowledged only the dlvine right ot k1ngs, the peasante were
treated little 1e88 than ·c..els l

,

to be loaded and reloaded.

To this day, the peasant tolls under a system marked by a
glaring abaence ot mutuallty in the holding and exerc1sing ot
right8 and obligatlons.
~roduoe

The ueasant's i8 the duty to work,

and relinquish a good deal of the fru1ts ot his work.

Gult waa merely the most lmportant torm ot relationship between the tillers and their overlords and between the latter
and the Emperors.

There are other less important and les8

pervasive re1stlonabine round to th1s day in

a

modern dress.

In the North, the lowest in rank, 81Ilongst the 81)'J)ropriator8 ot surplus i8 the Chika-Shum (a veritable reminder

ot the Engli8h -revee~ Wh08e nower comes trom hie hereditary

nossesslon ot local adm1nistrative functions.

Th18 nerson

1. not 80 much a member of the feudal nobilIty

AS

between the Government and the

~ulatlon

the llnk

livlng on the

land. 78 He obtaina such authority noraal1y by selection trom
among the famllle8 whose anceators flrst settled the land In
a T,)8rtlcular area.

Being from the area., hi8 local knowledge

has been, aa Perham saya, -the stabillzlng factor In

A

system

In which changing governors, roving armies, and a distant
Emperor 1)181'ed the more dramatic, but often the more supertlclal uart8.- 19

In return for this Important service, and

by virtue of hi8 primAcy in local aftairs, he Is entltled to
thls day, at least 1n Begemldes Province, to collect some 25
kilos of cereals tram each tl1ler 1n the area over whlch has
Jurisdlction. 80
Above the Chlka-ShWD, and more Imnortant in rank, was
the Fereaegna (llt.horseman) who recelved
~roduce

ot the uea8ant).

am8h~

(1/5 ot the

This nerson had a180 the rIght to

exact labour service tor the cultIvat10n ot hls lend, the
construction of his hou8e, etc. and the rlght to demand collectlve glfts trom the 1)eS88nts on feast days, ell In return
for mliltary servlce In tlmes of war, and malntaining lew end
order in neace tlmea. 81 This tenure form hAS survived some
ot the changes wrought on it in the last thlrty to forty years.

Today, the FeresegnA ls used only to malntsin law and order
In the rural areAS where nollce forces are not thought to
be adequate.
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As we 1nd1cated ear11er 10 Chapter II, consequent to
the oonquest ot the Southern halt ot the country, two-th1rds

ot the land was oontlscated

trOll

lts orlginal owners, and

dlvided into several categorles suoh

a8

to

sup~ort

all that

'large proportion of the population which had withdrawn itself
troll work" 1n the North and, a large pro-port1on ot
ot the same denoalnation ln the South.

cooptees

As ln the North, Gu1t

and R1ste-Gu1 t became the, archetypal torms ot re1at1ons ot appro1)riat1on and author1 t7 1n the South.

The Church too, be-

came once again the verltable reciplent ot large Gu1t eatates
whlch it, 1n turn, dlstributed amongst lts lIe.bers in return
tor ecc1eslastlcal servlce.

In turn, the latter parcelled

out thelr ho1d1ngs to the DlUch abused and 18lpover1ahed shareoroppers.
The institution ot roresegnet which 1n the North entitled the 'horsellAn warrlor' to collect several dues and obligationa tro. the peasants

Y8S

in the South converted 1nto a

right called Maderia to hold land trom the Crown for

88

long

as the right holder llved and contlnued to render m1litary
servlce..

Be1ng by profe.slon mostly a tlghter And not a

cultivator, once agaln the taSk or productive work

WAS

lett

to the t11lers ot the land.
Aa a result ot •

~roce

•• ot modernlzat1on that was

started some torty years ago, the above relAtions or

a~nro

pr1atlon and authorlty have undergone certain changes.

In this

respeot, the aaJor change has been the instltutlonalizat1on ot
the relations

or

authorlty in an autooratic system or

bureaucracy, and the re1at1ons of anpropr1at1on 1n a system
of egr1culture1 lend taxation.

As such, todey, Gu1t rights,

for instance, do no longer carry with them the authority to
administer an area or to
With respect to the

di8~ense

Justice.

a~propri8t1on

of suroluB, however,

albeit now in the torm of taxes na1d in cash, the system has
remained substantially the same.

Although we do not nossess

now any data on the amount of appropriation in the form of
tax, the following table may

g1v~

a rough indicat10n of the

major surviv1ng toras of appropriation- and the extent of
it in the a.aaured areas of ten out of fourteen nrovinces
of the country.

* To be aure, Proc1amat1on

2)0 ot 1966 had abolished, seve
1n reapect of the Church, Qu1t, Riete-Gult and Biseo. In
fect, however, such rights continue to belong to their
holders.

DISTRIBUTION OF MEASURED LAND ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT TENURES (1n Gashal of 40 ha.)
Church
Gebbar Semon Gult
Province
11688
Shoa
46271
S66
(1).6) (0.7)
(53.7)
Aru8al
17022
9699
(41.2)
(2).5)
We10
1074
6475
(81.8)
(13.6)
Well ega
4254
219:37
36
(0.1)
(44.:3
(S.O)
2861
Herarge
7697
(45.1)
(16.7)
Illubabor 14307
15S1
(49.2)
(5.3)
Kef, "
192
61
26355
(,. :3
(44.4)
(0.1)
Gemu Gor,., 2386
6
171
(0.0)
(16.7)
(5.4)
Sid8mo
20692
1596
(42.8)
(3.:3 )
Bale
2.5081
1280
(2.4)
(47.8)

-

1

-

Total

Source:

188223

(~6.4)

34699
(8.6)

675
(0.2)

Cond~nsed!MLR De~,.rtm~nt

MenglBt
10515
(12.2)
7085

(11~1)

Mader18

~135
8.6)

1099
(2.6)

H1ete
gult SlB80
4701
8450
(5.4)
(9.8)
1399
4779
(3.5) (11.7)
8

15898
(:32.1)
2989
(17.5)
6474
(22.3
2178.5
(46.9)
11150
(17.8)

1823
:( 3. 7)
238
(1.4)
1857
(6.4)
458
(0.8)

21~69

1027

(4 .5)
11992
(22.9)
115457
(28.4)

(0.4)
457
(0.9)
3026
(17.7)
289
(1.0)
1297
(2.2)

-

1343
(2.1) (2.8)
(0.1)

-

968~

12520

48

(2. )(3.1)

-

Gu1t
89
(0.1)

35
(0.4)

6777
( 13.1)

-

4532
(lS.6)
1360
(2.3)
9

(0.1)

-

-

-

(1.3)

143
(0.3)

26535

267
(0.1)

628

-

_( 9. 5)

--

Total
86188
41241
7918
49481
17092
2906,5
59286
14322
48431
52466
40,5490

of Land Tenure (1971).
~

\J\

)6

The table doe8 not 1nc1ude the 8ize ot the areaa with1n the
appropr1ative reach ot the numerous churches and pr1vate indlvldua1s 1n the Northern provinces, since here the system ot
taxat10n is not baaed on 1and measured 1n un1ts ot a ga8ha.
Nor doee it include the right8 of these persons or the churches
ln the unmeasured areaa ot the South ltse1t.
It ahowa, however, even I t roughly that the following
righta pertaln to variou8 claase8 ot

~eop1e

and various

church eltabli8hment8.
1)

The Church enjoys two Borta ot rights.

On the one hand,

lt i8 peraltted by law to collect and retaln tor its own uee
land and educat10n taxes, at':"! the rates ot taxat10n the Gt:lvernment haa laid down in relpect ot other lands, trom persQns who
themselvea own such land8.

!he rights ot the churche8 to enjoy

luch taxational author1ty 18 known as Semon.

In this regard,

the Church 1s rea11, a Government within a Government. Notloe
the 8ize ot land area to which Semon extend8.

It only the

land tax, and only tor Shoa Prov1nce, were converted into
tlgures, the amount ot B,uch tax alone would total to someth1ng
in the order ot Eth.$ 1116888 g.8haS x 1S or 10 or S.*
On the other hand, the Ghurch has the r1ght to own land

tor itselt - land wh1ch lt in turn dlstributes among its eccleslastical aeabers trom whoa 1t col1ecta ecclesia.stlcal serv1ces,

•

The ..ount ot land tax on a ga8ha ot land 18 Eth.t1S, 10,
and S tor terti1e, e.al-tertile and poor land re8~ectively.
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and agricultural income and education taxes.

The right of

the Church to hold land under such arrangements is known as
Church Gult.

However, the Church itself does not pay land

tex, wh1ch in theory is imposed on all lands.
2)

Similar rights enjoyed by private

different names

8S

~erson8

are known by

Gult, Riste-Gult and 8isso.*

Although

quite distinct in historical origin, the content of these
rights appears to be identical today.

They 8.11 refer now to

the right of a 1l,ereon to collect, from llUldowners wi thin the
area to Which his right extende, the land tax of Eth• •15,
10 or 5 after he has na1d a 8tralght rete of $3.,50 to the

Government.
Mader18 tenure has been, beginning with 1945 Ethionian
calende.r, nermi tted to crystallize into lnd! vldual ownershin.
Yet, even now there remains a large number of
this form.

Because it was only

th~

holdln~e

under

use and enjoyment of the

lend that was granted to the holder of such r1ght, he never
had to pay land tax.

Con8equently, even now after hie ri;rht

has been converted 1nto full
In terms of the size of
ant category of

re18t1onshi~s

ownersh1~,

he nays no land tax.

a"DprO~r18tion,

the most 1mnort-

1s Gebbar (individusl ownershln).

Today, the significance ot this term lies merely for tax 'Purposes, i.e. the owners of such lends do not pay land or other

*

The differenoe between Rlete-Gult and 5i8S0 anueare to be
merely one 1n origin end the rank of the rec1nient. 81880
right seems to have been given to nersoneof inferior rank.

)8

taxes to churches or private individuals in the torm ot Gult
or R1ste-Gult.

When th1s character is reaoved from thi8 cate-

gory, however, lt becoaes obvlous that the rlghts ot owners ot
such lands are not d1tterent trom those owning lands subject
to Semon or Gult.

In this 8enae then, the

a.b~

category ot

relationshiJ)8 i8 IDOre J)ervasl".. than the table above indicate ••
The model ot relationehlps 'that _erge. tro. this obeerYatlon,
then, i8 that at the bottom ot the 80clal relationa of productlon we have the landless and saal1
renters.

~art-owner.

and

~t

Above thell are the landlorde who are, as the analy-

als on tenanc1 showed, the

a~roprlator.

ot teudal rent, tithe,

te •• , etc., and above the landlOrds are the Gult, Riate-Gult
and S1 •• 0 holders who appropriate the surplus product of the
tillers in the tora ot taxes.

This doe. not .ean, bowever,

that the latter are Dot landowners the.ee1vea.
converee 1. true.

In tact the

The point ls simply that while the actual

cultivators ot the land are united b1, and have acce.8 'to the
national eoonollY through, the .edlua ot share-cropping tenancy
and small pea.ant prcrprletoNhil), the landlorde are united by,
and have aoce88 to the

.~lu.

nroduct ot the cultivators

through the .edlua ot the 80vereignty ot ownerlh1p, and the
nobl1lt1 b1 Gult and 8uoh 8i.i1ar right..

SUch are the net-

work of 80clal relationships that govern the regulation ot
labour, the appropriation and di8tributlon of the 80clal 8Ur~lus

product aaongst those that oontrol the power8 of the

State; and the.e are the re1atlona within the
whieh agricultural

~roductlon

takes place.

~ramework

ot
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CHAPTER

tti

I!plication8 tor Development
In thi8

~art,

we 8hall oon8ider 80ae ot the major

~

plication. tor development ot the dominant torae ot property
relationships:

!!!l.

and

9:!!!!

in the North, and share--crop-

ping tenanc7, large land ownershlp and tradit10nal teudal
rights pertaining to surplus appropr1ation in the South.
course, a paper such as this cannot

~retend

Ot

to otter 1nter-

pretationa that are exhaustive or tinal.

Renner baa well observed that every legal lnstitution
is designed priaarily to enaure the ind1vldual ln society with
hi. .eens ot reproduotlon, hi. 8ubsl.tence, however meagre,

tor plainly the 'preseryat1on ot the species is the natural
law ot every 80clal ord.r l • 82

In this regard, !y:..!! i8 at once

the eoonomic and legal lnatitution whicb aerve. tbls function.

By the .... token,

80

1a abare-cropplng tenancy - the inBtltu-

t ion through the ae41wa ot which the landless p ••••nt in the
South, and eyen 10 the North, partlc1pates 1n the product1on

ot tood, and the distribution and conauaptlon ot It.

Juridi-

cally, the 4itterence b.tween the two llea 1n the amount of
power and llbert1es the tormer r1ght gives a8 opoo8ed to the
latter.

Eoonoalcall7, the latter institution otfers no secur-

ity or acce •• to any def1n1te source ot income wh1le the boast
ot the ln8titutlon ot Rlat ia ita dlstinctlve quality a. a

guarantor ot

80m.

land, howev.r llttle.

Bence, the ideologi-

cal boast ot the Northern pea.ant: Ito be landles8 18 to be

·.

40
aub-human· even though in teras ot the income be gete trom
his land, he m1ght be no Blore-human· than his Southern
counterpart.

Be that

A8

1 t ••1', the

~rocea8

by

which the

pea.ant ln both area• .., become progreaslvely les8 ·subhUllan- 18

a function ot the nature

or

development in whlch he

must be read, and willlng to participate.

And When viewed

trom the need. of .uch development, nelther the lnatltution

ot R18.t nor 'that at tenancy hold proal.lng prospecta.
anal1818 ot th•••

~tments

both lnst1tut1ona

~re8ent

To an
we

shall now turn.
A.

Slze ot Fara 8tructure and Technlcal SaCkwardnee.
By tar the most aerious consequence ot the Riat sYltem

la lts capacitl to
alEed hold1nga.

prec1~1tate

literally ml1110n8 ot emal1

Slnce it 1s • baa1c nor. of th1s .yatem tor

the otf8Prlng of a

!!!! owner to dlv1de

and lubd1v1de progres-

81vely the lnherlted land equally amongat them, and aince it
1a the rule to lnher1t land on both 11nes ot deecent, -peasant
holdlnga are found not on11 1n s . .ll 812e. but a180 acattered

1n one or 8everal v11lage..

~e

result ls dWarf holdings ot

usually no .ore than halt a hectare or 1ea8.

At a time where

land 18 no longer plent1ful and I-ural over-population ever
more rlslng, holdings are correapondlng11 ever more dwlndling
1n alze.

The exodus ot peasante tram Welo Prov1nce 1nto what

they belleyed or were led to belleye to be unoccupied land in
GoJJam Proy1nce 18 • ca•• in point.

So 18 the case or hun-

drede ot poor pea.ante, part1cularl1 tram Tlgre Provlnce,
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tlooklng lnto Addie Abeba and other cities.

In these and

other prov1nces in the North, oenturies of cultivat10n has,
additionally,

80 aap~ed

the fertility or the 8011 that the

effort of the peasant on so min1scule hold1ngs 1s hardly any
more oompen •• ted.
In his work Amhara Land Tenure, in a miniscule region
1n the North, Allen Hoben has attempted to disprove the observation that many peasants in this region are land-poor by
claiming that

• with the exception ot artlsants, tormer

slaves and strangera ••• , most tarmers are able to obtain substantial amounta ot land rent-free n• a, He torgets, however,
that "80clal institutions are a8 much 1mportant as available
land in determining whether or not peasants are land-hungry ... e4
If he means by "land-poor l that generally

~eaB8nte

are not

entirely without land, however small, the point is eas1ly conceded aince, a8 we saw above, the great merit of the B!!!
system 1s its c8-paolty to prov1de everyone

~·lth Ii

r1ghtful

claim with 80me land and thus w1th some secur1ty for subs1stence.

The question, however, i8 the quality of life that

suoh land assurea the

~easant.

better quail ty lite 18
Hence the numerous

8.

As Hoben h1mself must adm1t,

functlon ot more and better land.

d18~ut.8

and endless l1t1gat1on over land.

The B!!! By.tem 18 a180 an 1mpediment to the tuller ut1l1zation of the labour resources of the individual and his family

members and the expan8ion ot agr1cultural activities on
rational Sizes of lanc1..

S1nce the agricultural sector 1s

• «
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characterized by such a torm ot labour organization, i.e.
many petty individual oentres

or

~roduotion

with virtually

no organio connection between the one and the rest, there i8
very lltt1e dlvlsion ot labour, and still le88 need for adopting modern

~roduotive

methods 8uch as meohan1zation and the

expans10n ot the internal market. 8S

From this perspective, it

should be obv1ous that sign1f1oant technical progres8 1s a requlrement that accompanles the proper organlzation of the
torces of produotion ot both land and labour.

W1thout this,

1t 1s only natural that the Ethiopian peasant Just as h1s
counterpart everywhere (except the Japanese peasant, and then
only once)86 should continue to use the same methods and instruments ot cultivat10n in a repet1t1ve and orthodox fashion.
Hence too, the conservatism ot the peasant and hie aversion to
everything that 1s new. 8?
The Hi!! syatem 1s inhibit1ve of expanded production in
yet another sense.

The t1me wasted, the extra expenses incur-

red 1n tarming disoontinuous and amall plots ot land, the endlea8 litigation arising over claims to land and boundaries
and the resultant social conflicts are the veritable coneequenc8s ot a system ot property relationships that merely enBures the subsistenoe needs

or

the family and the appropria-

tion by those who have claims to the pessant's produoe.
this senae, what the

~

In

system does is to perpetuate poverty,

limit the extent to which the peasant partiCipates in the
market, and inhibit the prooes8 of capital acoumulation preCisely because agricultural operations are oonducted on very

·

.
8mall holding8 1ncapable

o~

yieldlng larger 8urpluses tor

more production and oonauapt1on, and reinvestment into agriculture or other sectors ot the economy.

Even tor those per-

sons who, by maninulating the inherent weaknesses ot the system or eTen by legitimate means, acquire large enough lands,
the tact that auoh lands may usually be had only 1n ditferent
parlshel haa meant that it 1s imposs1ble to operate such lands
88

a unit in order to rat10nalize agricultural operation8.

Assuming that there are elements in the soclety who are
interested and have the economio capacity to engage in a
rational and more productive agr1culture, the method ot distribut10n ot land, the 1deology ot the system which excludes the
possibi11ty ot the 8a1e ot land, and the tact that Ethiopian
Feuda118m gave the feudal c1a8sea tew or no rights in lend
means when viewed genetically, that on the one hand these
classes oannot even nov

de~r1ve

the

~ea8ant

ot h1s means ot

product1on and, on the other, that rules ot the Rist sy8tem
do not

~erm1t

eas11y the pract1ce

o~

soc1alist agr1culture.

Oonsidered in this light, it i8 possible to argue that one of
the reasona tor the success of the lords ot the manors or their

ta,rmers in medieval England in undertaking the enclosure movement was the nature ot the rights these classes had in the
land. SS

It was muoh easier for the Engl1sh landlords and

yeomen to enclose on the

~oor

peasant, given the economic

condit1ons such as 11 prosperous wool trade whleh oa1led tor
such a mov••ent. 89 than tor their Ethionian counteroart8 who
enjoy no similar r1ghts 1n land 1n the Northern part ot the

·.

44
This 18 not to say that depriving the pea.ant of

country.

hie means of production tor the
agr~eu1ture

or

is what i. needed.

~ro8perity

ot capItalIst

That alternatIve, 1n the torm

proposal to ·indiv1dua1ize· property in land, has already

bee~ ~eddled

as

to the Ethiopian Government by foreign advisors,

such a proposal would, 1n and ot it8e1t, accomplIsh

more than the documentatIon ot land r1ghts in IndivIdual
namea, and a8 it, even i t suoh proposal were to accompl1sh
more, suoh 8ocompliehment would be in the interests of the
broe4 ... se8 ot the poor ~eople.90

On the contrAry, such a

proposal has lIere1y the advantage tor those with money ot
depri.1ng the peasant of his land and oonverting him either
into an agricultural worker, a 1and1es8 peasant or an entIrely
Jobless person.
~e

experience gained in the Chilalo Agricultural Deve-

10p. .nt Unit ooncretizes 80me ot the implIcatIons outlined
above.

In this project area (1n the South), where a system ot

more individua11zed

~roperty,

although. not completely liber-

ated trom feudal trappinga, 1a the dominant mode ot relatIons,
haa been hlghly tacl1itatlve ot the riae ot cap1talist relat10ne in agr1eulture. 9l

Here, with the advent ot

8

package

program ot agricultural and market1ng serv1ces (tractors,
fertIllzers, etc.) the landowning class wae quick to consp1re
with an emergent clas8 or contract farmers 1n order to evict
the share-crop:oera and oonsolidate small hold1ngs to sizes
appropriate to the aval1able technology.92

In other worde,
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the tact that in the South the tillers ot the land are not
necessar11y the owners ot it has meant, econom1c cond1t1one
perm1tting, a much treer leeway tor the landowners themselves
and/or ,,1 th the alliance ot oontract tarmers to malte the
trans1tion to a new mode ot production.

As well, it has been

much eaaier tor international development agenc1es such as

CADU, AID and the lBRD to become catalysts 1n this

~rocea8

in

the areas ot the South than in the North preCisely because ot
the ditference in the degree ot individualizat10n in the
nature ot property relationah,ipa between the two regions.

For

these agenCies, the system ot property relat10nships 1n the
North ia aeen as anathema to the starting ot "development"
projects which have as their pumose the catalyt1c introduction ot capitalist relations.

Ansrt trom the undesirabi11ty

ot the consequences ot such relat1ons, the system ot inter-

national intervention 1s likely to generate ana. perpetuate
uneven development within the same country..

That appesrs to

be the reason tor t,he current tlurry ot package progr8me. of
"development" in the South and the v1rtual absence ot similar
programs in the Northa

1·1any ot the consequenoes tor development outlined above
8.p1>1y ,,1 th equal torce in the Southern halt of the country

too.

•

Even though there i . a h1gh degree ot concentration of

For th1s po1nt, I am 1ndebted to Protessor Donald Harris
or the Department ot Eoonomic8 ot the Univers1ty ot Wiscon8in,
Hadison.
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ownership here the size of ownershlp ls unimportant to the
mode or its use.

In other words, slnce landownershlp, es-

pecially when it ls concentrated, ls dlvorced trom farm management - in Ethlopla he must indeed be an exceptional landlord who 8011a hia 80tt handa 1n the dirty cycle ot agrlcultllalwork - concentrated ownership 18 operatlonal1zed by
"renting out· 8mall plots ot land to individual ahare-croppers
on the basis ot verbal agreements.

In terms ot the size ot

tarm structure and the petty individual nature of agricultural
product1on and the consequences ot these on

ca~it8l

accumula-

tlon, fuller labOur utilization, dlvialon of labour etc.,
the tenanted holdings ot the South are-as much irrational as
the small owned holdings ot the North.
Share-cropping tenancy has other consequences that 8,re

too

well~known.

The share tenant who pays halt or more at

the produoe to the landlord will not 1mprove the land or

8~ply

any extra labour or capital unless he is convinced that his
extrA in~ut wl1l bring hlm a return more then twice its cost?3
In very simple terms, what this means 11 that a share tenant
who 1ncurs a production coat ot say, a '100 will have to ex-

pect a return more than '200 to Justlfy his effort and investment, otherw18e his own returns w1ll at best cover his expenses which neither will increase his income/nor compens8,te
his extra work. 94 Moreover, under conditlons or insecurity
And teudal eubservience 1.e. under conditions which permit
the landlord to eee himselt a8 80vereign and the tenant as
always 8ubJect to his whims and caDrlce, the tenant is not
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l1kely to experiment and innovate.

The resultant lack ot

technioal backwardne8s 1s particularly aggravated by the tact
that, atter the payment to his landlord of teuda1 rent, t1the,
tees, etc., the tenant has little or noth1ng lett tor endeavora ln the d1rection ot technlcal progress.
Some have put torward the argument that the

Mnegatlve

ettect ot ahare-cropp1ng upon agricultural development could
be greatly reduced were input costs to be shared in the same
proportion as returns, and that this would ensure the sharecroppers a marginal rate ot return comparable to that ot an
owner-cultlvator." 9 S However, and as Erich Jacoby has correctly uolnted out, this solution makes only theoretlcal aense.
In practice, a8 we saw above, since the landlord does not take
part 1n the prooess ot agricultural production beyond parcelling out land to his tenanta, such a solution tin almost certainly r~~ counter to the lnterests ot the landowning c1888. 96
More importantly - and this i8 where this solutlon misses the
polnt altogether - la considerable part of the costs, the
cu1tivator 1 s labour, cannot really be shared by the landowners
without break1ng

u~

the entire structure ot established

tenure ayetell. 197
The Juridical

o~po81te

every varlety 1s ownerah1'P.
land ownersh1J)

hilS

ot the instltution of tenanoy

or

'l'radl t1ona,11y, the concept ot

been viewed aa a relatloneh1n between man

and matter 1.e. between a ·property - subject" and a ·~roperty
- object l • 98 The petty peasant proprietor8h1~ ot the North
mlght be 8ald to 1nvolve this relat10nship whereby the

·

.

48
institution ot

~

seoures the obJeot of farming i.e. the

land, to the tarmer and the institution of succes8ion en8urea
the cont1nuity ot labour and oonsumption and the reproduotion
ot the species.

In the Southern pArt of the oountry, however,

where landownership is u8ually divorced trom produot1ve function, to own large areas of land is aotually to own large
numbers ot people, particularly where the tenant, ae 1n
Ethlopia, has tew or no alternative opportunlties and no eduoation which he might otherwise have used to improve his position.
In the South it i8 not the ownership of land but the institution of tenancy that, tor the most part, lerves the tunotion
of nroduotion ot tood and the regulation of agrioultural
labour.

Ownership ot land, on the other hand, is a title to

feudal rent, tithe and tee8, and the source and basis of the
soelo-economic and political power of those who have a monopoly of it and the consequent subJeotion of those who do not
have it.

And it is this institutionalized monopoly that i8

called the State which decide8 the tate of those who are engaged in productive work after having systematically excluded
them from participat10n in the political prooesses of decls1onmak1ng.

Small wonder then that in a 80c1a1 8ystem 1n which

the productive work of the tiller of the land is viewed with
contempt, even the opportunity to be elected to Parliament,
(more aptly described
AS

&8

a "committee of landlords")

8S

well

it may be, is foreolosed by election laws requ1ring parlia-

mentary candidate. to be themselves the owners of land. 99

'.
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The fundamental quality or landownership as it occurs
in Southern Eth1op1a is the sovereignty it bestows

u~on

its

enjoyer to do as he pleases not merely with the people subJect to his dominat1on but also with the land end the income
illeg1timately, unproduct1vely, and parasitically obtained
from it.

Hence, the reason tor 1eav1ng the land 1dle in the

m1dst of general landlessness and abject poverty.

From such

a vantage point of absoluteness, 1t is irrelevant whether
such use (or the absence of it) is inconsistent w1th the needs
of development or the dignity of others as much as 1t is 1rrelevant to the conception of ownership whether the owners of
land work 1t themselves.

The owner qua owner is under no duty

to society: neither 1s he under any duty to work his land nor
under any duty to exerc1se his nowera 1n

8

manner that does

not compromise the needs end requirements of develonment
th~

welfare ot others.

o~

Consequently, not only do pert1culerly

the large landowners often leave their lands idle but even
when they parcel out their lands to poor shere-cro'O'Oers they
use the inoome derived therefrom in a variety of unproductive
ways prec1sely because, jur1d1cally speaking, ownershl'O as a
legal concept being inditferent to the property - object ot
1t gives the owner of such income the right to f1ddle with it
just

8S

he 1dles with the land.
Thus, the unnroductlve nature of the ways 1n whlch sur-

nlua from agrlculture 1s used and the unproductive role of the
spenders of such surnlus cs.n already be 8.nt1c1PBted from the
not1on of ownersh1p itself, but more pe,rticu18r1y from the

so
le.rge landownership variety.

For unlike in the North where

small peesAnt proprietorshin servep, the tunctions ot nroviding the subsistence needs ot the tiller and the locus ot
nroduction and consumption, in the South landownersh1p Is an
instrument ot -poll tical rule.

To the general prodigality 8.nd

disdain tor nhyeical work ot the landownIng classes, the
Ethiopian case is no exception.*

Such characteristics have

been observed in widely disparate societies, say as that between England and ChinA; and are the same characteristics
that raised the ire ot Adam Smith and Ricardo.
In a similar vein, PhilIp M. Raup has wondered why it
is that:
"Peradoxically, cultures that hElve 'Placed SOCial
and economic (and noli tIcal) nremiums on land
acquisition B.nd ownershl"9 heve not 8.,lways accomnnnied this with hi~h levels of land Imnrovement
or agricultural production. Mloa
.
Al though there ie very little ''Oaredoxical'' a,bout it, the
question is

8.

valid one to raise in the Ethlonlan case too.

As in other similerly situated countries, the landowning
class does not engage in productive investment in egr1.culture
or, to extend Raup'e quest1on, productive investment outside

ot agriculture.

On the contrary,

8

good deel of the economic

eurnlus accruIng to it is spent - thanks now to the modern
American end European amenities of lite - on consnicuous

*

The French nobility, for instance, used to sneak of
Mderogation· i.e. 8 noble should refrain from taking un
nroduct1ve work in agriculture or commerce. Else he
derogated hie status.
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consumption goods 8.nd services of all kinds:

Mercedes Benz,

medical check-ups, sumptuous residences, etc., and opening
bank a.Ccounts outside of the country.
Baran notes,

d

Such attitude,

8S

Paul

may be to some extent irrational, nurtured by

the tradit1on, style of l1fe, end sociel conventions pecu11ar
to landed squires N• 10l To a large degree, however, it is
explicable by the eX1stential economic re8.lit1es obta1n1ng in
the country.

In the absence of stud1es and data, such ex-

nlenation can only be tentative.
Firstly, under cond1t10ns of

8

sim'Ole technology and

cheap 8.nd abundant labour the landlord can hs.rdly nerceive
the need to rationalize agriculturel production. l02 On the
contrary, w1th rents, t1the, fees alres.dy h1gh enough for mB.1nta1nlng his station in life - normelly sedentary bureaucrat1c
l1fe - it 1s much easier and simpler for the landlord to sit
beck 1n the towns and c1ties than gamble w1th h1s money on the
he. zards of B.gr icul ture which norm8.1ly does not 'PB.y off returns
quickly. 103

In this regerd, the expensiveness of imported

agricultural machinery militates against investment in AgricUlture. 104

In contrast, and particulBrly in the city of

Addis Abeb8. where, '08rtly from the ellocation of 'Olen exoend1ture, partly from nrivate investment in industries, end
pertly from other government exnenditure, there is

A

growing

concentration of economic develonrnent, the lendlords have
found it exceedingly "Orofi te,ble to invest the income obtAined
from agriculture in building modern anartment blocks to lease
them to the official class and officials ot internetlonal

·.

S2
agencies. lOS

On the other hand, foreign enterprise has pre-

emnted the non-agricultural sector - 15% of the pa1d-up cauital belongs to foreigners. 106

This phenomenon h'lS, among

other things, the consequence of cr1ppling the rise of an
1ndigenous capitalist class 'Worth the n8me. l0 7 Why the landown1ng class does not 1nvest more 1n the non-agricultural
sector than it does presently has to be inveetig8.ted further
by more competent nersons.

Tentatively, however, one can

offer the tollowing hypotheses:

1)

It may be that toreign

enterorlse in industry is already providing the landowning
class with handsome nrofits. 108

As the Ethionian manufactur-

ing sector is highly geared to the process1ng of food, textiles and beverages, it m1ght be that foreign enternrise has
prov1ded lithe outlet for the 'Droduce of the 1a.nded eetetes. 1.109
2)

The primary concern ot th1s class 1s nollt1cal stabi11ty.

We need not 'Drove here the connection between foreign enterprise (backed by the governments

o~

their countries of origin)

end the preservation ot the status quo.
Secondly, the absence of a wide enough market in agricultural products may go

80

fer to

ex~181n

,!)r1se on the 'DRrt of the landed c188ses. 110

the leck of enterAs is well known,

historically in the now Rdvanced countr1es of Eurone the ex'08n8&.on of the marketlll WIlS cruciel to the r1se of commercial agriculture and the concomitB.nt 81l1811ce between the
la,nded and the emerg1ng c8ni tAlist claese B.

In Eng18.nd, for

instance, the wool trede W8B decisive in setting the enclosure
movement in gear and m8rk1ng the tr8,nei t10n ·'from the feudal

·.

conception of land

88

the basis of political functions and

obligations to the modern view of it as income-yielding
1nvestment. Hll2

In today's world of mult1-national corpora-

tions and imoerialism, this condition is no longer available
to the landed classes 1n underdeve10ned countries.

At the

same t1me, the SUbsistence character of the economy and the
absence of well-developed towns and cities has the effect of
limiting the size of the internal market, and therefore limiting the nroductive 1nvestment
c1a88e8. 113

~08s1bll1t1es

B.

Ca~it8l

Sur,lus Annronriat1on and

of the lended

Accumulation

We have seen above how the netty owned holdings of the
North and the similarly

~etty

character of the tenanted hold-

ings of the South are lnconduclve to the nrocess of canital
accumulAtion in 80 tar

8.8

they do not 'Oermlt

8

much fuller

utilization of labour resources or the adoption of modern agricultural mach1nery.
sequences for

c8~1tal

Here, we shsll focus attention on the conaccumulation of the concention of land-

ownershin and the ownersh1n of 1ncome der1ved therefrom, and
trad1 tional relet10ns of 81lpropr18tion such 88 Gul t, 1·1aderi8,
etc.
As 18 well-known, every socio-economic system generates
eoonomio surplus and the "Size and mode of utilization" of
such surnlus determines Mthe rate Bnd direction of economic
develonment 1n

8

country. Ml14

Admittedly ,·the quantificat10n

of esnecie.lly some of the forms of such Bur-r>lus may be

Ii

·.

S4
d1ff1oult task but not the conceptua11zat10n of 1t.*

Accord-

lngly, Paul Beran has conce-ptualized economlc sur'OluB 1n
terms of actual and potentlal categorles 01' sur'OluB.

Accord-

ing to Bsran -- "Actual economic surnlus" is the dlfference
between soclety's actual current
con8~tlon.115

out~ut

and lts actual current

On the other hand, ·potent1al economlc sur-

plus" refers to ·the d1fference between the

out~ut

that could

be produced 1n a given natural and technologlcal envlronment
with the

of employable product1ve resources, and what
m1ght be regarded as essentlal consumptlon." 116 N~edle8B to
hel~

say,the realization of the latter category of economic surnlus
ls predlcated unon the !)reauppoelt1on that there would_ he

8

baslc reorganlzation of the production and distrlbutlon relations of society.

With th1s assumnt10n 1n mlnd, let us see

What may be cons1dered

88

categor1es of ·potent1al economic

surplus" as they ere represented by the nro"Oerty reletionshlns
e~18ting

1n Eth10n18 8t the level of relat10ne of

a~nroprla

tion snd authority.

•

The difflcul ties of qU8ntlf1catlon are quite 8.-part from
the absence or inadeqUACY of statlsticRl lnformation, "essentially reduc1ble to the fect that the category of the notentiel economic surolus 1tself transcends the horizon of the
existlng 80clal order, relatlng as it does not merely to the
easily observable performance of the glven Bocio-economic
org8nlzet1on, but aleo to the less readily vlsualized lmage
of a more ra tlonally ordered soclety. II Ps.ul A. B8.ren,
The_ Pol), t1cal Ec.Qnp!!y of Growt~. 1'.24.

,

.
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8.

The Conce'Ot of Ownersh1p and "Potential Economic Surplus"

As we sew above, because of the socio-economic realities
of the country and bec8use of the sovereignty with which prlvate ownership of land is imbued, the large landowners are
permitted to wantonly refrB,in trom "Outting their holc.1ngs to
nroducti ve use.

As

B.nd even though there are no
d8t~ show1ng these, it is common knowledgel1 ? that arePB of
11

reBu1 t

t

lend 8_re e1 ther underut1lized or not utilized et 811.

Ob-

viously, this state of utilization, or the leck of it, sets
8

defin1te limit to agricu1turel nroduction and the nroceee

of cenital accumUlation.

The general st8te of cultivation in

the country may be gleaned trom the following table:
Land Use in Ethiopia
Million hectares
-.-.--- -----------------..

Percent

Agricultural Land,
of which:
Cultivated land
Pasture land

68.8

---~---------

84.1

10.6

12.9
66.0

5.2

54.0
4.2

8.8

7.2

Barren or Built-un

17.2

14.1

Water and Water Courses

12.1

9.9

SW8.mps

Forests

Total

~ea

Source:

_____

--.-.--.---

122.1 . - - - -

100.0

Th1rd Fl ve Year Development PlAn (1968-73).

The table ehowe that about 65% of the oountry's tote1
area is potentially cultivable.
about

l7~

However, of this amount only

is "Oreeently under cultlvstion.

here with the accuracy of the above dAta.

We need not quarrel
Deenite its
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limitations, it brings home one cerdinal tact: the irrat10nality and WAstefulness of the system of property relat1onshIps which permIts the coex1stence ot large areas of underand

un-ut1ll~ed

land belong1ng to "Orlvate persons flnd the

Government and the small tenanted and owned holdings ot the
South and North.

Obv10usly, even if this paradoxical and ir-

rat10nal situation may have been the result of some "histor1cal necess1ty" in the nAst, its continued existence has no
justIf1cat1on.

On the oontrary, 1t calls tor drastic re-

organization.
The second major torm by which economic surnlus 1s dissipsted 18 also tied to landownershi-o.
ownersh1n g1ves the

~ro~erty-subject

Since l)r1vate land

the right not only to

receive rent , tithe, fees, etc. but 8.lso to snend these unnroductively (or leB8 productively than is desirable

8·8

in urban

buildings) 1n consuicuous consumpt1on of all Borts, this category ot economic surnlue too remsins notential.

It 1s impos-

eible to bp precise on the amount of such surnlue.
ing, however, thet

landlordshi~

Consider-

1s an ubiquitous institution

in much of the country - about fifty-five nercpnt of the rural
nOT)ulat10n are tenants l18 - and. considerin~ that the value represented by the payments of rent, tithe, fees, etc. to the
landlord cla8s, amounts between 40-.55% of the -produce of the
le,nd,119 the magnitude or such eurnluB must indeed be high.
b.

Tradit10nal Rights and Potential Surnlus
Potential economlcsurnlue occurs here in the form ot

taxes 'Osld to the Church And ,.,rlvate nereons.

Conservatively
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est1mated, the land area over wh10h the Churoh alone has
r1ghts of taxation either in the torm ot Gult and Semon, and
then only in the South 1s about l~ of the total land area: 20
In the North, 1n addit10n to these, there are numerous other
forms ot surplus

appro~r1at1on

by whioh the interests of the

Churoh are ~rotected. For instance, quite 8~art from the
numerous serv1ces and dues ~arish1oners are ob11ged to pay tor
the maintenance and construction of ohurch buildings, the
Churoh ofAxum has, tor one, rights to collect produce trom
the "Oeasants cult1vating what are known in Tigre Prov1nce as
D1mit (cat) and Beklo (mule) lands. Such are lands whose
tillers are required to relinquish a portion of their ~roduoe
for the purchase, ostenSibly at least, of cats to chase away
or k11l mice so the latter might not damage church ~ronerty
such 88 vestments and liturg1cal books, snd mules for the
8,nnu8,1 t)ageantry that 1s charaoteristio of the oelebrations
of the holidays ot this 'Dsrt1ouls.r Church. This 1s only one
out ot many Similar ways in whioh eurnlue 1s squeezed out of
the

~easantry

and dissinsted in eoonomically unnroductive

ways in the m8intenance of the higher stra,ta of en idle
nriestly c1a.8s.
The tax revenue that goes to nrivate "Oersons in the
forms of Gult, Riste-Gult, Sisso etc. is no lese considerable,
and to the extent that such surplus is used in conenicuoue
consumpt1on and for other nrest1ge-oriented
rem8.ine notential.

~urnoees,

it too

Although the number of such 'Oereons is not

known, the total land area to which their rights to collect
texee of Eth.$15, 10 or 5 (after

8

straight rate of $3.50 is

S8
paid to the Government) extends, constitutes eleven

~ercent

ot the total taxable land area,12l and then only in the South.

At the seme time, other persons ere exempted trom the payment
ot land taxes

8S

in the South (ct. Maderia and Galla land-

holders) or ere given tax disbursements as in the North (cf.
Feresegnas), or 8re permitted to collect nroduce trom the
peasante tor their own use (ct. Chika-Shum).

Occas10ned pr1-

merl1y by the absence or paucity ot mater1al and data on the
moda11ties ot such 8ur-olu8 ap'Pro'Orlatlon, and the magn1tude
ot potential economic surnlu8 they represent, the discussion

has necessarily been much brieter than the importance the subJect deserves.

Nonetheless, it has attemoted even 1t sketch-

11y the identlfication ot what might be regarded

8S

some major

sources ot potential economic surolus - sources that are
necessarily connected with the nrevai11ng mode of nroductlon
and the nature ot pronerty relet10nshins enpropr1pte thereto.
It the irrationality and wastefulness ot this mode ot nroduction is to be helted, 8nd the ch8racter of our

c1vl11~8tlon

8nd progress to be meaningtul to the toll1ng ma.sees of "Oeo-ple,
it i8

8

foregone concluslon that the exlst1ng

nroductlon i.e. the existing
reva.mped.

nro~erty

rel~t1ons

of

re19t1onsh1ps, must be

To say that these reletlonsh1ps must be rev8.l!1"ed

ra1ses the question of with whet they may be renlsced.
thiS, snd by way of conclusion, we now turn.

To

....

59

Conclusion:

The Organizing Principle

The fundamental oonclusion that emerges is that the
goal of increased agricultural production - in the many-sided
aspects in which we detined it - is

im~osslble

under the

existing :property relatlonsh1-os.Fundamentally, this 1s so
precisely beoause Ylroperty rele.tionshi-ps (and indeed society)
ere not organized on the b8.sie ot nroductive functions.

The

absence of nroductive functions as the basie for nronerty
organization 1s evident when one considers,

8S

we hS.ve in the

course ot the paller, that landownership And other relatione

ot

annro~riation

~roductive

are blatantly divorced trom use and trom any

dutr to society.

Fundamentally, and not simnly

because they s"end the 80cilll Burolus "Oroduct wastefully,
landlords And other traditional
as the Church

~ertorm

18 tempted to ask:
nroduction,

8

8npro~rlators

ot surplus such

no product1ve work themselves thAt one

Would there be

8.

decrease in agricultural

disintegration in the organi28tlon ot agricul-

ture and labour were auch rights to cease to exist?

Clearly,

except for the callous and those b11nded by self-interest,
when such rights are used tor the

~urnoee

of ensuring An 1dle

and paraSitic lite and the "Oerpetuetion of the dom1nat1on of
nroductive nersons in SOCiety, their defense becomes not only
a difficult task but also a

~indless

one.

Less evidently "functionless" but nonetheless unjustifiable is the organization of agriculture on the basis ot li!!!.
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Not th8.t it does not pertorm a produot1ve function in the
sense of guara.nteeing the aubslstence needs of the tAmlly And
1ts continuity at the level 01' the -oessant, but thAt trom the
standnolnt of 1ncreased agrioultural nroduction 1t 1s
to

8

8.

brake

re.t1onlll agricultural and property organizAtion c81'lable

of permitting tuller labour utilization, teohnical progress,
and oa-pit8l accumulation.
rationality - the lack of

This is the confluence of the ir~roductive

function - of the nro-

perty relationships, at the level of the peasant, in the North
as well as the South.

At the same time, this confluence sug-

gests the necessity to look for more or 1es8 1dent1oa1 solutions, on the basls of productlve functions, for both North
and South rather than emohs8izing superficial differences and
cha.racterist1cs.

Yet, it ls precisely here that land reform

of the v8.r1ety suggested tor Ethiop1a betrays a profound misconoe~tion

of the -oroblem.

It w111 be recalled that 1n var10us 'Places 1n thls paper,
we have hinted en t)s8sant that any pollcy of land reform which
views aa
Bhl~

!h.!. 'Problem the absence of lndlv1dus11zetlon of owner-

1n land in the North 18 ent1rely misconcelved.

We have

Argued that in the North too there 1s 1ndiv1dual ownership. It
has been our contention that the content of 'Drlvate ownershlt>
of land,

8S

any

other r1ght, 1s histor1c81ly 8'Oec1f1c to the

economic end social cond1tions U'Don which 1t 1s "Oredicated.
As such, the
lend, and the

~

owner haa the r1ght to use and enjoy the

~ght

to dec1de what to do with the land 1n-

clud1ng the im'Dortent dec1s1ons of leav1ng the land 1dle -

61

which is one element at the absolute ohe.raoter at individual
ownership - and
sions.

mL~ing

all management and investment deci-

Consequently, the abaence 01' land 8ales does not de-

tract the sovere1gnty

01'

1s 8ub,1ect to the control

the owner.
01'

In this regs-rd, the owner

neither any not10nal community

nor that of any tam1ly nor even that

01'

the state.

G1ven that

land 8ales and the Jur1dlcal not1on 01' oontract are structural 1ngred1ents 01' a developed market economy, the absence
01' these ingred1ents 1n a much le88 developed economy does
not mark the end of ownership. On the contrary, they mark
the path that the 1nst1tut1ons ot pr1vate ownership traverses
in the course 01' history. On this view, theretore, the consciously or unoonsciously internalized notion 01' ownership,
borrowed from a more mature economy, which equates ownership
with s8le 18 ~rofoundly wrong.
It is trom this pers'Dectlve thl'lt we will questlon the
relevance 01' land retorm 1.e. 01' the po11cy of individual'1z8tion of the already lndiv1dualized torm 01' nronerty relatlons
in the North.

Conventional reform, conceived ln th1s sense,

has been pushed 1n Ethio'Dla
lopment.

88

a cond1tion for economic deve-

The mag1c wand to be waved to usher in such develop-

ment i8 sinmle as it 1s simplistic.

It nroposee to document

the right of ownershin in individual names although 1n soc181
and economic terms land 1s held by individuel 'Dersons for own
account - in the wake of which, it i8 be11eved, land w1ll be
trf!ely sold.
88

Fundamental to th1s nro't)o8al is the bellef thet

:;'and now becomes saleable, the "more enterorielng" 'Cersone

in eociety (meAn1ng really the ones with money) w1l1 develon
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the lands more efficiently and more rat1onally.
is s1mple:

8

The equat10n

free market in land w1l1 bring about economic

development.
Quite apart 'from the 'Oerverted notion that equates

Menterprising persons Mwith anyth1ng more than money-bage,
the

~rol'08a1

begs the following tunde.mentel questions.

Flrstly, it begs the questlon of where such enternrls1ng
~ereon8

will emerge trom.

In other words, absent the economic

cond1t10ns snd the 80clsl att1tudes anpropriate for free m8rket relations i.e. absent

8

market for the

~roduce

of the land

and without removing the 1mmob1l1zing effects of the reletions
of aT)'propr1"t10n, it is difficult to see how the mere legal1zat10n of the sale of land w1ll usher in market

rel~t1one.

Ract it, not been for the absence of a wide enough m8.rket for

the produce of the land and other

~roducts,

the present form

of J)roperty relAtions would have given way before our own eyes.
Secondly, even if some -enterpr1sing nersons M, ~resumB
bly bureaucrats 1n Add1s and elsewhere, were to be 1nterested
in agr1culture, the pro~osal equates the consequent denriv~
t10n of the mssses 122 w1th economic develonment. The effects
of enforcing such

8

'Oolley w1l1 certainly be the following:

On the one hand, a greet maJor1ty of the neasents will be
mAde destitute, w1th no land to work on any longer in egrlculture. or 8.ny o'Onortuni ties in msnufacturing, emAll to begin
w1th and

~reempted

as it is by foreign

employe non-labour intensive methode.

ente~rlse

wh1ch

o~ten

On the other hAnd, 1n

the 8beence of restrictions on the nower of the "enternrieing

uersons" to do

88

they nlease with the 1ncome they obta1n

trom agr10ulture 1.e. 1n the absence of any nlann1ng which
would direct surplus to productive investment, lt is obvious
thAt the 1mportant tasks ot CA1'l1t8l acoumulation and investment Are once more t1amboyantly skirted.
What is the alterns.tivet

To let the ex1sting property

'~

relat10nships ,,1S, of course, just a8 bad

AS

to ettemnt to

break them down with 8 contrived policy of creat1ng a
in land.

m8r~et

The a1ternat1ve 11es ln a planned system whlch calls

for the justif1cat10n of r1ghts 1n nroperty by the nroductive
- SOCially and economically - function they nerform in society.
It 18 1mpossible to be nrecise now on what might be reQ:'Brded
as the content of this productive function.

Nonetheless, it

is poss1ble to outline some of its essential elements in terms
of the nrob1eme we Bet out to exolain by the nature of nroperty relationshins.

This means that rights in land (e.g.

individual ownership) must be justified by the extent to which
they enhance develonment, which in the case of agriculture is
8

function of reorgan1zing farm structure, adonting new tech-

nology, cAnital accumulation And investment.

Im"Olicit in

this criterion of productive function is the belief that ell
soc1ally and econom1cally relevant quest10ns

A8

to Wh9t oon-

stitutes nroduct1ve fUnction must nertein to the State renresent1ng the masses.
Once it is agreed that rights in land must be justified
by their productive funct10n,

8S

re18tlvely eAsier question

to what form of nroperty is

8S

def1ned by l'l8nning" ,1t is e
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more rAtion8l to eoonomic development.
into

min~_

as

the blllsie for

etnd

8,ocle1 Justice" 'Orogress
etc.

R

~lre

The ones thAt jumn

gus,ranteed And well-rounded ....
producer cooperetl vee J collectives

To discuss the edv8ntegee of these and related forms of

agricultural Rnd !lro'Derty organization is beyond the scone of
this paner.12)

~

Suffice lilt. to 'Ooint out the rations.li ty 8.nd

superiority of these torme in the o'DPortunity they ofter for
"large-scale agriculture, the 8'P'Olication of technology, e
more efficient labour utilization, ••• economy of available
administrative end extension staff resourcee"124 And

·'a

bull t-ln mechanism for saving, investment, and the 8,dminietration ot tax. "125

Thus, if land reform 1s to be relevant 1n the North, it
ought not to Justify the nrlnciples under which it reorders
property by market forces which not only do not exist but even
it they do Booner or later become run-away forces over which
the majority of the

~e8santB

will have no control.

Given the

underdeveloned nAture of the economy And the lnternetlone,l
constraints to develonment such

88

foreign enternrise, 'Orice

monopoly, trade limi tA.tione, the State must be the .2n!. orgRnization in society on which must rest the responsibility for
directing the rhythm end tem-oo of the economy on the bs,sie of
nlanning and diecinline.
his

nro~erty,

The individual, Be sovereign over

now a8 under the prouosed policy is basically

incepeble of undertaking such responsibility beyond his own
nerrowly defined ends.
In the South too, the principle of nroduct1ve functions

6S
a'Pl)liee with equel torce precisely becs.use the fundamental
problems of increeeed agriculturel nroduction, the rationalization of agriculturel and nronerty organizations end the
alleviation of noverty ere common to both regions even though
the relations of property are slightly different.

Hence,

here too one is forced to ask whet the conception end relevance ot lend reform ought to be.
As i8 well-known, ln many 'Oredomlnently agrarian eocleties where there exists a gre8,t bifurcation between those who
c oncentrete in their 'OR,trimony excess 1 ve landowners:"in but
who perform very little or no nroductlve functions and those
who are landless but who

~erform

productlve funct1ons, land

reform has been conoe1ved mostly as a 'Oolitical gimmick to
satlsty the demands of clamourous peasants (and even ot
docl1e ones) by break1ng Ul> large est8tes amongst them.

This

is done on the assumption that the redistr1bution of land
provides the framework for future oo11tical stability
as economiC growth and soclal Justice.
Assumed - that the breaking

u~

88

well

Polit1cally, 1t is

of le.rge landownership will

liberate the masses end help involve them ln the "rocesses of
decision-making by Government.

While 1t is difficult to deny

here the advance ln 1')olltlcal 'Oartlcl'OAtlon such

8

meeeure

may re1')reaent, 1t 18 imno8eible to regArd land redistribut10n
813

being c8'Oable of reordering the '0011 t1cs.l structure of

8

country where, Just as before, 'Oolltlcel "ower will undoubtedly remain - reinforced by

8

compens8.tlon scheme of one sort

or another thBt usually goes with redietributlon - in the
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hands of the .. exnro'Orie.ted ,. lendownere and othere in Governmente
Economically, it is fallaciou8 to think, as the pro'Oonents of land redistribution do, that the "breaking U'O ot
large estetes, endo"tlng some landless 'Oeas8nte wl th 'Diots of
thelr own, and freelng tenants of thelr opnre88lve obligatione" 126 would increase agriculture.l !)roduction, ensure
s8ving and investment and ca.-pital accumulation.

Here it 1s

necessary to quote Baran At length:
"Undoubtedly the immediAte effect of such measures
would be a more or Ieee 8igniflcant increase in the
ne888ntry's d1sno8eble income. Yet with the income
level as low 8·S 1 t 1s, and as it would remAin even
after the large estates had been s'Olit u~ into a
multitude of dwarf hold1ngs and after the nayments
of rent had been entirely 8.bolished, llttle if 8.nything would be saved out of the income increments
••• Worse stlll, the narcelling of land would reduce
the possib1lit1es tor 8ch1eving whet 18 obviously
the foremo·st need 1n ba.okw8.rd countries: e. rs'Oid
end substanti8l increAse of its aggregAte outnut.
For an agr1cultural economy based on tiny ferms
units would otfer 11 ttle opl)ortuni ty for an 1ncre8.se
of productivity. To be sure, someth1ng CAn be
e.chieved by 1mnrovement of seeds, by increased
usage of fertll1zers, e.nd the like. As noted
before, however, 8 major increase of nroduct1v1ty
8.nd_ outnut de~ende on the noesih11i ty of introducing spec1a11zation, modern m8chinery, draught
nower, 8 ~o8s1b1l1ty present only under conditione
of large-sosle ferming."12?
The reader will notice that Beran'e arguments ere couched in
language - "s"011 tt1ng up large estates-' - that 8ssumes thAt
large ests.tea in Ethio'Oi8

~re

onereted

88

a unit.

Thet this

1s not so for Ethio'01s. has been made clear in Chs")ter II.
Yet, even lf large lends are not

80

operAted in Ethioule, and

therefore there will be no "sn1i tting up", were Ipnd redistribution to become a goel of

Ethlo~lan

1)011cy.

it is qu1te
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obv1ous that since the effect of lAnd redistr1bution is to
confirm the already enlit un tenanted holdings in ind1vidual
ownersh1p, the 8.rguments are eque.lly well 81')nlicable.
On

A.

legal 'Olane, 1n many countr1es the no11cy of le.nd

redistribut1on, w1th all the above weaknesses And in snite of
them, has been Justlfied by and carried out under the theory
thet individual ownership must nerform

8

socie.l funct1on. 128

ContextuAli2ed in this way, the effect of the nrinci'Ole of
social function has been to look u'Oon latifundie with disfavour129 either because they ere not used nroductively or
because, in anite of the state of their nroductive use, the
consequence of the monono1y of landownershln 1s the denrivs.tion of the millions.
is to

~rovide

As such, the nurnose of social function

the JustificAt10n for the taking of lend, often

after a reserve hes been left for the nrev10u8 lsndownere,
and the establishment of family farmsl)O - m1ll1ons of ind1vidual ferms which do not ensure increased agriculturel
"Oroduction, emnloy modern machinery or guarantee saving and
investment.

For Ethloni8 to redistr1bute nronerty on the

be,ele of th1s nrinc1-ole 18 to ren11cate the 'Pattern of ownershin in the North and to advance agriculture
88,Y,

BS

Bar8n would

li ttle beyond leaving the peasantry with more d1Eroos8,ble

income to be anent unproduct1vely.

In th1s sense, and in

terms of the tiny size of the resultant ferms (eunhemlst1c811y celled "family farms") unlikely to nrovide the locus
for increased agr1cultural 1')roduct1on, or 1f they were
tavoured by nollcy to exist,very likely to be swallowed un
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enywe.y by bigger fa.rmers, money lenders, lend speculators,
etc., red,letrlbutlon on

8.

Ufamily" bReis nerforme Ii tt1e 'Oro-

duct1ve funct10n and suggests the necess1ty, by the Stete, to
orge.ni2e agriculture end nro'Oerty on cooperative, collective
or related bases.
Secondly, because the nrlnc1ple of social funct10n does
not quest10n

~r1vete

ownereh1n of land - 1ndeed reinforces

it J - the consequence he-s been the entitlement of the landowners to cla1m and receive compensation in the course of a
land reform program.
8

Since the nurnose of land red1stribution,

t least ostens1bly, is to readjust wealth, to break the be.ok

of an unproduotive and paras1tic landownlng c18e8, one fails
to Bee why compensat10n should be made - why the landowners
should be perm1tted, 1n effect, to ralse nubilc tpxee for
nrive.te use - t)art1cularly since redistribution is sought
preCisely beoause nr1v8te ownershin of lend has fa1led to
nerform its 80-called "80ciAl funct1on."
t1ller of the land

AS

1n

Ethio~ia h88

Indeed, the actual

'O&id eo much 1n liberty,

dlgnity, rent, tithe, etc. that one 1s comnelled to ask if
c Ompen88,t ion is not due the other way A.round.

1·~oreover,

Edmundo Flores s8.ye,eummeriz1ng the Mexican exnerience:
"Judg1ng by the Mex1can exner1ence, 1t can be said
that Rny attem~t to pay comnensation - excent symbo11cally - leads to an insoluble solut1on ••• An
agrarian reform needs to be followed by 8 vigorous
effort to increase the rates of ca1)1tal formAtion.
It would be self-defeating to take resources from
1nvestment and give them to the old oligarchy,
'Psrticularly if we consider that giv1ng buying
power means ~utting in their hands more elements
w1th wh1ch to f1nAnce counterrevolut1on."lJl

as
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Our nurn08e is not to discourage land reform ner se
but to raise the quest10n of whet tyne.
mean1ngful to the broad masees of the

If it 1s to be

neo~le

on

8

more last-

1ng baSis, to be oatalytio in releasing their creetive energles, to increase agrioultural production, investment and
cB~ni tal

accumulation, land reform must be grounded ln the

nrinciple that agriculture must be organized around

8

!)ro-

perty form that ie justif1ed by the degree to which it performs productive functions.

In large -part, the questlon of

what 1s produotive can only be declded by the State representing the mAsses.

And in the final aoalysis, incressed

agricultural nroduct1on, lnvestment,

c8~itA1

8ccumu1etlon,

etc. ere a functlon of cooperative e,nd collective forms of
nroperty orgs_n1zat1on wh1ch encourage 1ndustry to look to
egrlcu1 ture end agriculture to industry.
nos81ble only under nlsnning by the State.

In turn, these 8.re
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